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THE CHARACTERIZATION OF
BARRIERS TO INTERPROVINCIAL
TRADE UNDER THE CANADIAN
CONSTITUTION©
By GEORGE VEGH*
This article identifies barriers to interprovincial trade
as a legislative subject matter under the constitutional
division of powers. It argues that interprovincial trade
barriers should be characterized in terms of the
disproportionate impact that provincial measures have
on the flow of trade between the provinces. The term
"disproportionate impact" means the measures'
impediments to the flow of trade which are not
necessary to implement the objectives of provincial
legislation.
This method of identifying trade barriers has been
used to address trade barriers and other arrangements,
such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, the
North American Free Trade Agreement, the Treaty of
Rome, the United States Constitution, and the federal-
provincial agreement on internal trade. It is also
consistent with the ancillary doctrine under the
Canadian Constitution. Under this doctrine, laws
aimed primarily at a matter within a legislature's or
Parliament's jurisdiction may validly contain provisions
intruding into a competing area of legislative
jurisdiction. Justification of such laws will depend upon
the seriousness of the intrusion into competing areas of
jurisdiction.
Cet article affirme que les barri~res A I'dchange
interprovincial proviennent du domaine l6gislatif en
raison de la division constitutionnelle des pouvoirs. II
soutient que les barri~res A I'6change interprovincial
doivent 6tre caract~ris6es en prenant en consideration
l'impact disproportionn6 des mesures provinciales sur
les flux d'6changes entre les provinces. Le terme,
"impact disproportionn6", signifie des obstacles aux
flux d'6changes qui ne sont pas n6cessaires a la
r6alisation des objectifs de la l~gislation provinciale.
Cette mdthode d'identifier les barri~res 5 l'6change
a 6t6 appliqu~e aux barri~res A I'change et a d'autres
arrangements, comme 'Accord grndral sur les tarifs
douaniers et le commerce, l'Accord du libre-6change
Canada-Etats-Unis, l'Accord du libre-6change nord-
am6ricain, le Trait6 de Rome, la Constitution
am~ricaine et I'accord fdd6ral-provincial sur I'change
interne. Elle est aussi compatible avee la doctrine
auxiliaire sous la Constitution canadienne. Selon cette
doctrine, des lois qui s'adressent principalement A un
domaine appartenant A la juridiction d'une legislature
ou du Parlement peuvent comprendre des dispositions
qui touchent s d'autres domaines de juridiction
16gislative. La defense de ce type de loi d6pendra de
l'importance des effets sur d'autres domaines de
juridiction.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The flow of interprovincial trade, as a legislative subject matter,
is within Parliament's jurisdiction over the regulation of trade and
commerce pursuant to section 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.1 As a
result, provincial legislatures cannot pass laws prohibiting
extra-provincial transactions. However, pursuant to sections 92(13) and
92(16) of the Constitution Act, 1867, provincial legislatures may pass laws
respecting local trade.2 The problem arises when these two competing
I (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
2 The precise basis for provincial authority over local trade may vary by reference to the
legislation at issue. In this article, I shall, for the sake of convenience, refer to s. 92(13)-property
and civil rights-as the primary provincial jurisdictional basis. Having said this, it is not clear that
all of provincial trade regulation may be reduced to the regulation of property rights and civil rights.
Jurisdiction may also be found in provincial authority over local works and undertakings (s. 92(10))
and local and private matters (s. 92(16)). I believe that the better way of understanding provincial
jurisdiction in this area is by reference to provincial jurisdiction over local trade as a subtraction
from Parliament's jurisdiction over interprovincial and international trade. In Reference Re Farm
Products Marketing Act, [1957] S.C.R. 198 at 211-12 [hereinafter Farm Products Marketing], Rand J.
articulated this more general concept of local trade as falling within a provincial residual power:
Local trade has in some cases been classed as a matter of property and civil rights and
related to head 13 of s. 92, and the propriety of that allocation was questioned. The
production and exchange of goods as an economic activity does not take place by virtue of
positive law or civil right; it is assumed as part of the residual free activity of men upon or
around which law is imposed. It has an identity of its own recognized by head 2 of s. 92. I
cannot agree that its regulation under that head was intended as a species of matter under
head 13 from which by the language of s. 91 it has been withdrawn. It happened that in The
Citizens Insurance Company of Canada v. Parsons; The Queen Insurance Company v. Parsons,
assuming insurance to be a trade, the commodity being dealt in was the making of contracts,
and their relation to head 13 seemed obvious. But the true conception of trade (in
contradistinction to the static nature of rights, civil or property) is that of a dynamic, the
creation and flow of goods from production to consumption or utilization, as an
individualized activity.
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bases of jurisdiction collide: what happens when provincial legislation in
relation to a local trade matter has the result of impeding or effectively
preventing the interprovincial flow of trade? Such a scenario requires a
more subtle analysis of the way in which constitutional trade jurisdiction
should be divided. The need for subtlety arises because the flow of
trade, by its nature, is dynamic; it is about the way in which people,
goods, services, and capital move across the country. It is therefore
difficult to fit the elements which go into regulating this flow into
categorical constitutional distinctions.
On the whole, the Supreme Court of Canada has sought to avoid
the need for a more subtle analysis of this issue. Rather, it has sought to
classify legislation as being either in relation to a local matter or an
interprovincial matter. The result of this approach has been a number of
inconsistent decisions which, I shall argue, do not correspond to the
underlying purposes which the division of powers over trade should
serve.
My thesis is that interprovincial trade barriers should be
characterized by reference to the disproportionate impact which
provincial measures have on the flow of trade between the provinces. By
disproportionate impact, I mean the measures' impediments to the flow
of trade which are not necessary to implement the objective of otherwise
valid legislation. The method by which disproportionate impacts are
identified should be by way of the ancillary doctrine, also called the
necessarily incidental doctrine.
According to that doctrine, laws which are primarily aimed at a
matter within a legislature's (or Parliament's) jurisdiction may validly
contain provisions intruding into a competing area of legislative
jurisdiction provided that such an intrusion is justifiable. This
justification requirement varies by reference to the seriousness of the
intrusion; where the intrusion is marginal, it may be justified by showing
that the impugned provision is a rational and functional part of an
otherwise valid scheme; where the intrusion is more serious, the
provision must be justified as necessary to implement the scheme. The
Head 16 contains what may be called the residuary power of the Province: Attorney-General
for Ontario v. Attorney General for the Dominion et aL, and it is within that residue that the
autonomy of the Province in local matters, so far as it might be affected by trade regulation,
is to be preserved. As was recognized in the Parsons case, supra, this points up the
underlying division of the matters of legislation into those which are primarily of national
and those of local import.
See also, to the same effect, Laskin C.J.'s concurring decision in Manitoba (A.G.) v. Manitoba
Egg and PoultryAss'n, [1971] S.C.R. 689 at 706-07 [hereinafter Manitoba Egg].
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applicability of the ancillary doctrine to interprovincial trade would
parallel the way in which trade barriers are addressed in other contexts.
Most importantly, from the Canadian perspective, on 18 July
1994, the federal, provincial, and territorial governments concluded the
Agreement on Internal Trade.3 The Agreement, which took effect in
July 1995, states that its purpose is to "reduce and eliminate, to the
extent possible, barriers to the free movement of persons, goods,
services, and investments within Canada and to establish an open,
efficient, and stable domestic market." The conceptual centrepiece of
the Agreement is the identification of trade barriers as obstacles to
internal trade which cannot be justified by reference to legitimate
objectives. The operative justificatory principle is proportionality. A
trade barrier will be justified under the Agreement where it is aimed at a
legitimate objective and does not result in a disproportionate impact on
the movement of trade in light of that objective.
Proportionality is also a central element in addressing trade
barriers in other arrangements. It is used in identifying barriers under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,4 the Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreement,5 the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 6 the Treaty of Rome,7 and the United States Constitution.
In these arrangements, the concern has been similar to that in the
Canadian trade context: how to reconcile legitimate exercises of local
authority with the movement of trade through and among these
jurisdictions. The proportionality principle as adopted in the Agreement
and as applied in international, European, and American trade law is
thus similar to the ancillary doctrine. In both cases, they function to
determine the validity of local trade regulations which impact on
extra-local matters by reference to the reasonable necessity of the means
taken to implement local objectives.
3 (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1994) [hereinafter Agreement].
4 GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, Can. T.S. 1947 No. 27 [hereinafter
GATr]. A comprehensive new set of agreements was reached in 1994 that established a World Trade
Organization, while encompassing the GATT. See The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts (Geneva: GA'nr Secretariat, 1994).
5 Free Trade Agreement between The Government of Canada and the Government of the United
States of America, 22 December 1987, Can. T.S. 1989 No. 3 [hereinafter FrA].
6 North American Free Trade Agreement: between the Government of Canada, the Government of
the United Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America, 17 December 1992,
Can. T.S. 1994 No. 2 [hereinafter NAFTA].
7 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 25 March 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
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This article is organized as follows. First, I shall outline the
Canadian interprovincial trade jurisprudence. My emphasis will be on
those cases where the Supreme Court of Canada has addressed the
constitutionality of provincial regulation of goods destined for export
from the province. I shall argue that what is lacking in these cases is a
sensitivity to the underlying constitutional values at stake in the division
of powers over interprovincial trade. My thesis is that these values
would be better served by the application of the ancillary doctrine than
by the various approaches which the Court has taken to the issue.
Second, I shall provide a summary of the proportionality
principle as adopted in the Agreement and as applied in international,
European, and American law. I shall also discuss the remedial
provisions of the Agreement insofar as they touch upon constitutional
issues.
The final part of this article shall address the conceptual and
functional compatibility of my thesis with other constitutional principles.
As to conceptual compatibility, I shall consider criticisms of the ancillary
doctrine as I propose it should be applied. I will also consider concerns
with respect to the emphasis that my argument puts on the effects or
impact of legislation for the purposes of constitutional characterization.
What drives both of these concerns is an underlying position in favour of
judicial restraint in federalism cases. I shall argue that the legitimacy of
judicial review in the interprovincial trade context is more sustainable
than in other areas because of the impact that trade barriers have on
persons outside the province.
As to functional compatibility, I shall argue that treating
provinces as analogous to the independent states which are parties to
international agreements is historically supportable. In this regard, I
shall also argue that the remedies provided by the Agreement raise
constitutional concerns which may undermine its effectiveness and which
indicate the need to integrate it with the division of powers under the
Constitution.
II. TRADE AND COMMERCE UNDER THE
CANADIAN CONSTITUTION
Interprovincial trade is one element of Parliament's jurisdiction
under section 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867 to pass laws in relation
to the regulation of trade and commerce. The concept of interprovincial
trade as a legislative subject matter has its genesis in the Privy Council's
decision in Citizens Insurance Company of Canada v. Parsons.
1996]
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The words "regulation of trade and commerce" in their unlimited sense are sufficiently
wide, if uncontrolled by the context and other parts of the Act, to include every
regulation of trade with foreign governments, requiring the sanction of parliament, down
to minute rules for regulating particular trades. But a consideration of the Act shews that
the words were not used in this unlimited sense.
Construing therefore the words "regulation of trade and commerce" by the various aids
to their interpretation above suggested, they would include political arrangements in
regard to trade requiring the sanction of parliament, regulating trade in matters of
interprovincial concern, and it may be that they would include general regulation of trade
affecting the whole dominion.8
This quotation from Parsons has occupied much of the
jurisprudence and scholarship in the constitutional trade area. -Most of
the recent deliberations have focused on the meaning of the so-called
second branch of Parsons, the "general regulation of trade affecting the
whole dominion." This article focuses on the first branch, the regulation
of trade in matters of interprovincial concern. In particular, I shall
address the way in which the first branch of Parsons constrains provincial
legislatures. I shall pay less attention to the jurisprudence respecting
8 (1881-82), 7 App. Cas. 96 at 112-13 (P.C.) [hereinafter Parsons].
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federal legislation in this area,9 although the two issues are obviously
related.10
This branch of Parsons has been generally accepted to mean that
Parliament has jurisdiction over the flow of interprovincial trade, while
the provincial legislatures have jurisdiction over intraprovincial trade.
The issue for the courts has been to identify the outer boundaries, or
9 The leading cases addressing federal legislation in this area are: R. v. Eastern Terminal
Elevator Co., [1925] S.C.R. 434 [hereinafter Eastern Terminal], and British Columbia (A.G.) v.
Canada (A.G.), [1936] S.C.R. 398 [hereinafter Natural Products Marketing], aff'd [19371 A.C. 377
(P.C.). In Eastern Terminal, a majority of the Court struck down federal regulation of grain
terminals even though most of the grain was to be exported from the province. Duff C.J., whose
decision has become the locus classicus in the interprovincial trade area, identified what he
described, at 447-48, as the "lurking fallacy" in the argument that the regulation of interprovincial
trade may carry with it a need to regulate individual forms of trade:
Obviously that is not a principle the application of which can be ruled by percentages. If it
is operative when the export trade is seventy per cent of the whole, it must be equally
operative when the percentage is only thirty; and such a principle in truth must postulate
authority in the Dominion to assume the regulation of almost any trade in the country,
provided it does so by setting up a scheme embracing the local, as well as the external and
interprovincial trade; and regulation of trade, according to the conception of it which
governs this legislation, includes the regulation in the provinces of the occupations of those
engaged in the trade, and of the local establishments in which it is carried on.
Similarly, in Natural Products Marketing, the Court struck down federal regulation
respecting the marketing of natural products. In order for the products to be brought into the
marketing scheme, it had to be shown that either the principal market for the natural product is
outside the province of production or that some part of the product produced was outside the
province: see the Privy Council's discussion of the scheme, at 386. Duff C.J., at 414, stated the
following for the unanimous Court:
Legislation necessarily incidental to the exercise of the undoubted powers of the Dominion
in respect of the regulations of trade and commerce is competent although such legislation
may trench upon subjects reserved to the provinces by section 92, but it cannot, we think, be
seriously contended that sweeping regulation in respect of local trade, such as we find in this
enactment is, in the proper sense, necessarily incidental to the regulation of external trade
or interprovincial trade or both combined.
For a discussion of these decisions and the lack of a role for the ancillary doctrine in support of
the exercise of federal jurisdiction in this area see: G. Le Dain, "Sir Lyman Duff and the
Constitution" (1974) 12 Osgoode Hall L.J. 261 at 298-301; and H.S. Fairley, "Jurisdiction over
International Trade in Canada: The Constitutional Framework" in M. Irish & E.F. Carasco, eds.,
The Legal Framework for Canada-United States Trade (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) 131 at 148-49.
10 Although there is a relation between the outer boundaries of federal and provincial
jurisdiction under the Constitution Act, 1867 generally, and interprovincial trade in particular, it
does not always follow that finding an absence of provincial jurisdiction to enact a scheme results
automatically in a finding that Parliament does have jurisdiction to enact an identical scheme. As
Laskin C.J. stated for the unanimous Supreme Court of Canada in Central Canada Potash Co. v.
Saskatchewan, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 42 at 75 [hereinafter Central Canada Potash]:
It is true ... that (with some exceptions, not relevant here) the British North America Act,
1867 distributes all legislative power either to Parliament or to the provincial
Legislatures, but it does not follow that legislation of a Province held to be invalid may
ipso facto be validly enacted by Parliament in its very terms.
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what William Lederman called "equilibrium points,"") between these
two general bases of legislative authority.
The one area where the case law is clear is that provinces may
not pass laws prohibiting extraprovincial transactions. Thus, provincial
marketing schemes that prevent provincial residents from purchasing
goods from suppliers outside the province have been struck down.) 2
Similarly, provincial legislation prohibiting liquor transactions has been
held to be constitutional provided that it does not prohibit transactions
between provincial residents and persons outside the province. 3 In the
latter context, the Privy Council noted that even where the scope of the
provincial legislation is restricted to the activities of persons within the
province, inevitably, "it must interfere ... indirectly at least with business
operations beyond the limits of the province."14
The extent of that permitted interference has occupied much of
the Supreme Court of Canada's treatment of constitutional jurisdiction
over interprovincial trade. The question is the extent to which local
trade regulation may interfere with the movement of interprovincial
trade. The Court has taken two contradictory approaches to this issue.
The first has been to restrict provincial jurisdiction to transactions which
are entirely completed within the province so as to prevent any
interference with interprovincial trade. The second has been to hold
that the effects of provincial regulation on interprovincial trade is
constitutionally irrelevant.
An example of the first approach is found in Prince Edward
Island (Potato Marketing Board) v. H.B. Willis Inc.15 In that case, the
Supreme Court of Canada considered the constitutionality of provincial
legislation which authorized a potato marketing board to require dealers
engaged in marketing potatoes to collect as agent for the board a levy
from potato producers. The Court unanimously held that the levies
were unconstitutional to the extent that they applied to potatoes with an
extraprovincial destination. Taschereau, Estey, and Cartwright JJ. held
that the levy was an indirect tax and thus inconsistent with the restriction
that legislatures may only pass direct taxes pursuant to section 92(2) of
11 W.R. Lederman, "Unity and Diversity in Canadian Federalism: Ideals and Methods of
Moderation" (1975) 52 Can. Bar Rev. 597 at 604.
12 Manitoba Egg, supra note 2 at 703; and Bums Foods Ltd. v. Manitoba (A.G.), [1975] 1 S.C.R.
494 at 502.
13 Manitoba (A.G.) v. Manitoba License Holders' Ass'n, [1902] A.C. 73 at 80 [hereinafter
Manitoba License Holders]; and Gold Seal Ltd. v.Dominion Express Co., [1921] S.C.R. 424 at 446.
14 Manitoba License Holders, ibid. at 80.
15 [1952] 2 S.C.R. 392.
362 [VOL 34 No. 2
Baniers to Interprovincial Trade
the Constitution Act, 1867. The remaining six members of the Court held
that the fee could not be levied with respect to potatoes leaving the
province because such an application would interfere with Parliament's
jurisdiction over interprovincial trade. Kerwin J. (Fateaux J. concurring)
held that such an application of the levy was "clearly referable to export
trade and cannot be supported." 16 Rand J. stated that "[t]he scheme
before us is primarily one of trade regulation. Apart from taxation, so
far as it extends to external trade it is invalid."] 7 Kellock J. (Locke J.
concurring) approached the problem as follows:
In my view, the powers so given go beyond the mere regulation of the potato trade within
the province or carriage thereof from one provincial point to another, and encroach upon
the sphere of the regulation of interprovincial and export trade. There is no attempt to
confine the scheme or the orders under it to local as distinguished from export trade, and
it is to be remembered, as was admitted at the bar, that the business of marketing
potatoes in the province is preponderantly an export business.18
The remaining judge, Rinfret C.J. upheld the levy insofar as it
"can be limited in its operation to affect only transactions intended to be
wholly and ultimately carried out within the Province."'19 The result was
that the application of the levy to goods with an extraprovincial
destination went beyond provincial jurisdiction over local trade.
A similar approach was adopted by a majority of the Supreme
Court in Farm Products Marketing.20 In that case, the Court was
required, by the terms of the reference, to consider the validity of
provincial legislation establishing a marketing scheme in which a
marketing board purchased and sold farm products and distributed the
sales proceeds among the producers. The terms of reference directed
the Court to assume that the legislation "applies only in the case of
intraprovincial transactions." 21  The meaning of this assumption
occupied most of the Court's reasoning. Four of the seven judges who
addressed this issue held that an intraprovincial transaction only involves
products to be consumed in the province. Kerwin C.J. stated: "Once an
article enters into the flow of interprovincial or external trade, the
subject matter and all its attendant circumstances cease to be a mere
16 Ibid. at 409.
17 Ibid. at 416.
18 Ibid. at 423.
19 Ibid. at 400.
20 Supra note 2.
21 Ibid. at 203.
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matter of local concern." 22 Locke J. (Nolan J. concurring) held that
intraprovincial transactions consisted of:
purchases and sales of the controlled product, whether hogs, fruit or vegetables in their
natural form, for consumption in the Province, and sales to processors, manufacturers or
dealers proposing to sell such products, either in their natural form or after they have
been processed by canning, preserving or otherwise treating them, for consumption
within the Province.23
The Court's approach in these two cases thus severely restricts
provincial regulation over goods which will enter into the flow of
interprovincial trade. Under this approach, goods which are intended to
move through the province are effectively immune from provincial
regulation respecting their production, sale, or processing.
The Supreme Court has rendered a number of decisions that are
inconsistent with this line of reasoning, but has not expressly retracted
from this position.
In Carnation Co. v. Quebec (Agricultural Marketing Board),24 the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a plan approved by a
provincial marketing board which set the price at which a milk processor
was required to purchase raw milk from producers despite the fact that
most of the processed milk was destined for an extraprovincial market.
Martland J. addressed the argument that the destination of the milk
should be relevant for constitutional purposes:
That the price determined by the orders have a bearing upon the appellant's export trade
is unquestionable. It affects the costs of doing business. But so, also, do labour costs
affect the cost of doing business of any company which may be engaged in export trade
and yet there would seem to be little doubt as to the power of a province to regulate wage
rates payable within a province, save as to an undertaking -falling within the exceptions
listed in s. 92(10) of the British North America Act. It is not the possibility that these
orders might "affect" the appellant's interprovincial trade which should determine their
validity, but, rather, whether they were made "in relation to" the regulation of trade and
commerce. 25
2 2 Ibid. at 205. See also, at 210, Rand J.'s statement to the same effect. Rand J. repeated this
view extrajudicially, stating that "to declare that the transactions with which a statute deals are those
within the province can be effective only where a producer confines his sales to consumers within
the province": see I.C. Rand, "Foreword" in A. Smith, The Commerce Power in Canada and the
United States (Toronto: Butterworths, 1963) at xi.
23 Farm Products Marketing, supra note 2 at 231.
24 [1968] S.C.R. 238 [hereinafter Carnation].
25 Ibid. at 252.
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In Re Agricultural Products Marketing Act,26 Pigeon J., for the
majority, held that Carnation stood for the proposition that the
regulation of production "whether agricultural or industrial, is prima
facie a local matter, a matter of provincial jurisdiction." 27 Provided that
the provincial legislation was aimed at production, it did not matter
where the goods were destined: "In view of the reasons given, the
conclusion could not be different even if the whole production has been
going into extraprovincial trade."28
The Court's approach in the two foregoing decisions is thus to
treat the goods' movement in interprovincial trade as irrelevant for
constitutional purposes. Seen this way, a province's jurisdiction is not
restricted in any measure by reference to whether goods move through
the province. Instead, the Court effectively adopted a distinction
between production and marketing as a proxy for intraprovincial and
extraprovincial trade. This distinction has not been consistently applied.
In Central Canada Potash,29 the Court struck down a provincial
prorationing scheme restricting the production and setting the sale price
of potash. In so doing, Laskin C.J. emphasized that "[t]he only market
for which the schemes had any significance was the export market."30
Furthermore, the Chief Justice was not prepared to save the legislation
by applying the distinction between production and marketing which
Pigeon J. emphasized only seven months earlier in Agricultural Products
Marketing. The following remarkable passage illustrates how the
concepts of production and marketing may be collapsed for
constitutional purposes:
It is, of course, true, that production controls and conservation measures with respect to
natural resources in a Province are, ordinarily, matters within provincial legislative
authority. This Court's reasons in its recent judgment in ... [Re Agricultural Products
Marketing Act] supports that view. The situation may be different, however, where a
Province establishes a marketing scheme with price fixing as its central feature.3 1
One more example should suffice. In Canadian Industrial Gas
and Oil v. Government of Saskatchewan,3 2 the Court struck down
26 [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198 [hereinafterAgricultural Products Marketing].
27 Ibid. at 1293.
28 Ibid. at 1294.
2 9 Supra note 10.
3 0 Ibid. at 72.
31 Ibid. at 74.
32 [1978] 2 S.C.R. 545 [hereinafter ciGoL].
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provincial legislation that imposed a surcharge on oil produced in the
province. The surcharge equalled the difference between the price
received for the oil and the world market price for oil prior to its rapid
escalation. The legislation also permitted the government to set the
price of oil where it determined that it was being undersold. Martland
J., writing for the majority, emphasized the fact that the oil "has almost
no local market":
This is not a case similar to Carnation Co. Ltd. v. Quebec Agricultural Marketing Board,
where the effect of the Regulations was to increase the cost of milk purchased by
Carnation in Quebec and processed there, mostly for sale outside Quebec. The
legislation there indirectly affected Carnation's export trade in the sense that its costs of
production were increased, but was designed to establish a method for determining the
price of milk sold by Quebec milk producers, to a purchaser in Quebec, who processed it
there. Here the legislation is directly aimed at the production of oil destined for export
and has the effect of regulating the export price, since the producer is effectively
compelled to obtain that price on the sale of his product. 33
The Court's treatment of the relevance of the movement of
goods for the purposes of determining the scope of provincial regulation
with respect thereto has thus veered from an intense focus on the
movement of goods, e.g., Willis, Ontario Farm Products, CIGOL, and
Central Canada Potash, to categorical statements that this is irrelevant
for constitutional purposes, e.g., Carnation and Agricultural Products
Marketing Reference. Furthermore, the Court has not provided any
rationale for determining when, and more importantly, the extent to
which the movement of goods should be taken into account. Rather
than identifying the way in which provincial legislation affects the
movement of goods, and considering whether that effect can be justified
in any given case by reference to the object of the provincial legislation,
the Court treats the fact of the goods' movement as a fact to be
considered in some cases and ignored in others.
In my submission, this area of jurisprudence is in need of
reconsideration. As will be discussed immediately below, the problem
with this first branch of Parsons is similar to that which plagued the
second branch of Parsons until the Supreme Court reconsidered that
area of law in General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing.34
The second branch of Parsons, it will be recalled, consists of the
"general regulation of trade and commerce." The various judicial
approaches to the issue have been well documented and I do not
propose to canvass them here. For present purposes, it suffices to say
3 3 Ibid. at 568-69.
34 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641 [hereinafter General Motors].
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that the problem with which the courts have wrestled has been to arrive
at a method of reconciling the federal interest in national trade
regulation with the provincial interest in regulating local trade. As the
above quotation from Parsons indicates, this balancing of interests is
what informed the interpretation of the term "trade and commerce" in
the first place.
The problem over the years has been that the courts have
avoided expressly acknowledging that they were balancing federal
concerns against provincial ones. Rather, they have taken a categorical
approach, holding that legislation is either in relation to local trade, and
thus within provincial jurisdiction, or that it regulates trade on a general
and national level, and is thus within federal jurisdiction. Of course, this
categorical distinction is unworkable: all general and national trade
regulation must also take place at the local level. The result was that this
second branch of Parsons had fallen into almost complete disuse.
Writing in 1981, James MacPherson stated that it "may well be
extinct."35 This branch was finally resuscitated when the Supreme Court
gave it a role to play by reference to measuring the respective federal
and provincial authority in General Motors.36 In that case, the Court
held that the federal Competition Act37 was supportable under the
general trade and commerce power and, in particular, that its provision
permitting enforcement by a private right of action was valid. Chief
Justice Dickson, writing for the Court, quoted approvingly from
academic writing which stated that the jurisprudence on the issue was
"abstractly legal, divorced from commercial context."38 Dickson C.J.
criticized the previous case law for not "correctly assess[ing] the balance
to be struck between s. 91(2) and s. 92(13)."39 The test which Dickson
C.J. proposed to incorporate this balance included a specific
requirement to consider the interaction of federal and provincial
interests by reference to their respective ability to legislatively address
the subject matter at issue. A valid exercise of Parliament's general
trade and commerce power, in addition to containing general regulatory
control over trade, is marked by the following criteria:
35 J.C. MacPherson, "Developments in Constitutional Law: the 1979-80 Term" (1981) 2
Supreme Court L.R. 49 at 71.
3 6 Supra note 34.
3 7 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34.
38 Supra note 34 at 658, quoting from B.C. McDonald, "Constitutional Aspects of Canadian
Anti-Combines Law Enforcement" (1969) 47 Can. Bar Rev. 161 at 189.
39 General Motors, supra note 34 at 660.
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(i) the legislation should be of a nature that the provinces jointly or severally would be
constitutionally incapable of enacting; and (ii) the failure to include one or more
provinces or localities in a legislative scheme would jeopardize the successful operation of
the scheme in other parts of the country.40
Of equal importance, the Chief Justice discussed the way in
which the constitutionality of the impugned provision, i.e., the creation
of the civil right of action, should be addressed. A civil right of action is,
of course, a paradigmatic example of property and civil rights.
Therefore, standing on its own, it would be within exclusive provincial
jurisdiction. In this case, however, it did not stand on its own; it was
used as a means to enforce federal legislation. The Court, therefore,
had to address the relevance of Parliament's adoption of this apparently
provincial remedial provision.
This type of problem goes to the root of constitutional
jurisprudence in that it is aimed at identifying the outer boundaries of
legislative jurisdiction. Particular legislative provisions, divorced of their
statutory context, are almost always capable of being characterized as
unconstitutional. In other words, constitutional litigation rarely involves
the question of whether an entire statute is unconstitutional. The more
standard approach is to concede that, as a general matter, the legislature
has authority to regulate a certain subject matter, but that in the
particular case, the specific means chosen go too far. The question for
the courts is how to situate the provision in its proper context so that this
claim can be evaluated: how far is too far? This involves looking both at
how far the provision strays from the remainder of the statute and, more
pointedly, how far it strays from the basis of legislative jurisdiction
pursuant to which the statute was enacted. The second element of this
question, i.e., the relation between the provision and the statute's
underlying jurisdictional authority, necessarily involves the question of
how close the provision comes to threatening the competing legislative
jurisdiction of the other level of government. Again, in General Motors,
Dickson C.J. set aside rigid legal categories as a basis for making this
determination and approached the issue as one of balancing between
federal and provincial jurisdiction. He acknowledged that the provision
at issue "does appear ... to encroach on provincial power to some extent"
and attempted to find a way to structure the permissible level of
encroachment. His conclusion was that a provision which encroaches
upon the constitutional jurisdiction of the other level of government will
only be constitutionally permissible where there is an appropriate "fit"
40 Ibid. at 662.
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between the provision and the underlying scheme. As Dickson C.J.
stated for the unanimous court:
By "fit" I refer to how well the provision is integrated into the scheme of the legislation
and how important it is for the efficacy of the legislation. The same test will not be
appropriate in all circumstances. In arriving at the correct standard the court must
consider the degree to which the provision intrudes on provincial powers. The case-law,
to which I turn below, shows that in certain circumstances a stricter requirement is in
order, while in others, a looser test is acceptable. For example, if the impugned provision
only encroaches marginally on provincial powers, then a "functional" relationship may be
sufficient to justify the provision. Alternatively, if the impugned provision is highly
intrusive vis-a-vis provincial powers then a stricter test is appropriate.
As the seriousness of the encroachment on provincial powers varies, so does the test
required to ensure that an appropriate constitutional balance is maintained.41
The test in General Motors is thus a form of the proportionality
test under which the courts will strike down legislative provisions that
prima facie extend beyond the legislature's constitutional authority
where the provision is insufficiently integrated with legislation supported
under a constitutionally permissible legislative objective. In other words,
where a constitutional challenge is aimed at a specific legislative
provision, as opposed to the entire statute, the government must justify
the provision by reference to its integration with the statutory scheme.
Only if this can be shown will the provision be upheld as "necessarily
incidental" to a valid exercise of authority. If the encroachment goes
beyond being necessarily incidental, i.e., if it is disproportionate, it will
be struck down. In such a case, only the disproportionate part of the
scheme is unconstitutional; the remainder is left to stand. The
necessarily incidental doctrine as propounded by the Court in General
Motors thus sets out the outer boundaries of legislative jurisdiction by
reference to proportionality. 42
41 Ibid. at 668.
42 Throughout this article I shall use the term "proportionality test" to include what is
sometimes called the "least restrictive means test." The concept of proportionality goes to whether
the impact of a government measure on a protected matter-in this case, interprovincial trade-can
be justified by reference to the object of the measure. The least restrictive means test refers to the
question of whether a government could have implemented its legislative objective by means which
are less intrusive on a protected matter than the means which the government did adopt. The
answer to this question is obviously relevant in determining proportionality: if the object of the
measure could be attained by less restrictive means, then the impugned measure may be
disproportionate.
It is true that the Supreme Court stated that the questions of proportionality and least
restrictive means are separate and distinct for the purposes of determining whether a measure
which resticts a Charter right is reasonable and justified under s. 1 of the Charter. See Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada
Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter]. However, in practice, there is little to separate
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In my view, the Court's treatment of the second branch of
Parsons in the General Motors decision should also be applied to the first
branch, under which Parliament has jurisdiction in relation to
interprovincial trade. The general trade and commerce doctrine was
saved from incoherence by the Court's willingness in General Motors to
openly acknowledge that a categorical approach to the issue was
inadequate: that the doctrine required a fundamental rethinking to take
account of, and expressly incorporate the fundamental constitutional
values that require balancing.
The problem with the first branch of Parsons is similar to that
which plagued the second branch of Parsons prior to the General Motors
case. The difficulty with categorizing legislation as being in relation to
intraprovincial or extraprovincial trade is that the movement of trade
defies these categories. Just as all legislation which may be conceptually
categorized as being a "general" regulation of trade must operate at a
level of specificity, all legislation which may be conceptually categorized
as being in relation to interprovincial trade also has an intraprovincial
operation. The solution set out in General Motors is to avoid the need
for drawing hard and fast distinctions by creating a flexible measure of
the operation of legislation in any given case. This measurement is
the two. Hogg has argued that asking both questions is redundant: "If the objective is sufficiently
important, and the objective is pursued by the least drastic means, then it must follow that the
effects of the law are an acceptable price to pay for the benefit of the law." See P.W. Hogg,
Constitutional Law of Canada, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at 883.
One possible distinction is that the least restrictive means test is a more stringent test, or
at least a more stringent application of the proportionality test. For example, in the international
trade context, some argue that the proportionality test provides "a looser or more flexible
balancing" than the least restrictive means test: see M.J. Trebilcock & R. Howse, The Regulation of
International Trade (London: Routledge, 1995) at 338. However, even here, the distinction is more
theoretical than practical. The least restrictive means analysis may be either stringent or flexible
depending on how it is applied. This is also illustrated by the s. 1 analysis under the Charter. One
way the Supreme Court has loosened the requirements of the least drastic means test is to speak of
a requirement that the legislature only infringe rights "as little as reasonably possible": see United
States v. Cotroni, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469 at 1490 [emphasis added]; and R. v. Edwards Books and Art
Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 at 795. By introducing the concept of reasonableness, the Court has
applied the least drastic means test in a way which gives greater scope to the legislature than would
appear from the strict wording of the term.
The second way in which the Supreme Court has lessened the stringency of least drastic
means language is to say that it is not enough to show that the government could have obtained an
equally effective end using other means. A Charter claimant must show that the government could
have obtained the same ends as effectively using other means: see R. v. Chaulk, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303.
This is an extremely difficult test and would exclude only the most redundant of legislative
provisions.
The Supreme Court has thus been able to import looser and more flexible standards in
the least drastic means test. It is therefore not clear that it is a more stringent test than
proportionality. Furthermore, even Trebilcock & Howse, at 339, appear to recognize the flexibility
of the proportionality test by arguing that deference for governmental policy choices may be found
in "the application of the least-restrictive means test."
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carried out both in the general definition of the trade and commerce
power, with its reference to whether the legislation is aimed at an area of
provincial inability, and in the development of the ancillary doctrine
which looks to the degree to which legislation intrudes into a competing
head of power.
In the interprovincial trade context, my argument is that
provincial jurisdiction should also be determined by reference to the
impact that provincial legislation has on interprovincial trade. Accepting
that some impact will necessarily result from virtually all provincial
regulation, the courts should identify the constitutional implications of
that impact. The courts should do this by use of the ancillary doctrine as
developed in General Motors, which measures the degree of permitted
jurisdictional intrusion by reference to the necessity of the intrusion for
the effective exercise of valid legislation. In the interprovincial trade
context, this means that provincial legislation which is otherwise validly
aimed at a matter within provincial jurisdiction should be reviewed to
determine the extent to which it intrudes on federal jurisdiction over the
flow of trade. Where a province cannot justify a trade impediment as
necessary to implement a valid provincial objective, the trade
impediment-the disproportionate part-should be constitutionally
characterized as being in relation to extraprovincial trade. In other
words, once it is determined that the disproportionate element is not
required for intraprovincial purposes, it is difficult to continue to
characterize it as in relation to intraprovincial trade. Rather, the
primary purpose and effect of the disproportionate element would
appear to be the prevention of the flow of interprovincial trade. Once
identified as such, there is no apparent constitutional rationale for
treating it as within provincial jurisdiction.
Further, the application of the ancillary doctrine in the
interprovincial trade area is more aligned with the general approach the
Court has taken to the problem of limiting the scope of legislative
jurisdiction. In this case, the* jurisdictional constraint under
consideration is provincial authority over property and civil rights in the
province in particular, and local trade in general. Characterizing the
outer limit of this jurisdiction by reference to its disproportionate impact
on the flow of interprovincial trade is consistent with the analysis by
which constitutional characterization has been carried out to give scope
to the national concern branch of Parliament's peace, order, and good
government (POGG) power and the general branch of trade and
commerce.
In both of these areas, the concern for the courts has been to
rein in the potentially unlimited scope of these jurisdictional powers by
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reference to the need to preserve provincial jurisdiction. In other words,
the courts have looked to a test which incorporates and balances
competing federal and provincial interests. The essential elements of
this test have been set out in the POGG power context as follows in R. v.
Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd:
For a matter to qualify as a matter of national concern ... it must have a singleness,
distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly distinguishes it from matters of provincial
jurisdiction that is reconcilable with the fundamental distribution of legislative power
under the Constitution;....
In determining whether a matter has attained the required degree of singleness,
distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly distinguishes it from matters of provincial
concern it is relevant to consider what would be the effect on extra-provincial interests of
a provincial failure to deal effectively with the control or regulation of the intra-provincial
aspects of the matter.43
The application of the proportionality principle in the
interprovincial trade context satisfies these requirements in that it
identifies interprovincial trade barriers-the element of provincial
regulation which contains a disproportionate barrier to trade-as a
self-contained subject matter. That element thus has, to use the
language from Crown Zellerbach, "a singleness, distinctiveness and
indivisibility that clearly distinguishes it from matters of provincial
jurisdiction that is reconcilable with the fundamental distribution of
legislative power under the Constitution." Furthermore, with respect,
disproportionality is a better method of identifying this distinctiveness in
the interprovincial trade context than the various tests adopted by the
Court. The cases which have held provincial regulation to be
inapplicable to goods exported from the province are not reconcilable
with the division of powers in that they provide no scope for provincial
regulation over the production, processing, and marketing of these
goods. On the other hand, the cases which disregard the movement of
goods and focus instead on whether the regulation is in respect to either
production or marketing, fail both to (i) contain a standard of
distinctiveness and indivisibility; and (ii) justify this standard by
reference to its reconciliation with divided jurisdiction over trade.44
43 [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401 at 432 [hereinafter Crown Zellerbach].
44 Katherine Swinton has defended the attempt to draw categorical distinctions in the trade
and commerce area-what she calls the "conceptual approach"--on the grounds that there is an
indeterminancy of results in any balancing test: see The Supreme Court and Canadian Federalism
(Toronto: Carswell, 1990), c. 5. As my preceding discussion of the case law indicates, I do not agree
that the "conceptual approach" has led to a predictable or sound jurisprudence.
[VOL 34 No. 2
1996] Baniers to Interprovincial Trade 373
As to the first requirement, marketing and production are not
each single, distinctive, or indivisible concepts in the interprovincial
trade context. Production and marketing are not easily separated. As
will be seen in greater detail in my discussion of the European case law
in Part III, below, marketing restrictions cannot be separated from
production restrictions. A restriction on production may function as a
restriction on marketing because, in order to be sold in the relevant
market, the goods must be produced in a marketable form. It is
therefore difficult to agree with Pigeon J.'s categorical statement in
Agricultural Products Marketing that "'[m]arketing' does not include
production." 45 The lack of distinctiveness in these concepts is also
demonstrated in the ease with which the Court collapsed them in
subsequent cases, where it struck down provincial production controls,
ostensibly on the basis that they were really aimed at marketing.
As to the second requirement of Crown Zellerbach, even if it
could be argued that production and marketing each do represent
discrete subject matters, it is not clear how a distinction drawn along
these lines serves to reconcile the division of powers over interprovincial
trade. It is accepted that, at least to the extent that it can be identified,
the flow of interprovincial trade is within federal jurisdiction. As a
result, a dividing line between federal and provincial jurisdiction should
seek to reflect this by reference to the movement of trade. The
distinction between production and marketing fails in this regard
because rules respecting production standards have at least an equal
potential to prevent interprovincial trade as do rules on marketing.
Indeed, the refusal of provinces to recognize extraprovincial production
standards do result in significant trade barriers. A survey of
interprovincial trade barriers conducted by the Conference Board of
Canada concluded that "the most frequently mentioned impact of
barriers was the adoption of inefficient production processes designed to
overcome the barrier."46
The Court's failure to appreciate the way in which production
controls impact on the movement of trade is illustrated in its decision in
Labatt Brewing Co. v. Canada (A. G.).47 In that case, the Court held that
federal production standards for the contents of "Light Beer" were an
unconstitutional intrusion into provincial regulation over production of
45 Agricultural Products Marketing, supra note 26 at 1296.
46 S. Loizides & M. Grant, Barriers to Interprovincial Trade: Implications for Business (Ottawa:
Conference Board of Canada, 1992) at 3.
4 7 [1980] 1 S.C.R. 914.
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goods. With respect to the interprovincial trade issue, Estey J. stated the
following for the Court:
The impugned regulations in and under the Food and Drugs Act are not concerned with
the control and guidance of the flow of articles of commerce through the distribution
channels, but rather with the production and local sale of the specified products of the
brewing industry. There is no demonstration by the proponent of these isolated
provisions in the Food and Drugs Act and its regulations of any interprovincial aspect of
this industry. The labels in the record reveal that the appellant produces these beverages
in all provinces but Qu6bec and Prince Edward Island. From the nature of the beverage,
it is apparent, without demonstration, that transportation to distant markets would be
expensive, and hence the local nature of the production operation.48
The Court thus asserted, "without demonstration," in its words,
that beer production is inherently local because of the nature of beer. It
did not consider how provincial jurisdiction over beer production
influenced the lack of interprovincial movement in beer. As Ian Irvine
and William Sims demonstrate, local production rules were introduced
for the very purpose of ensuring that beer marketed in the province is
also produced there:
[I]t was not until recent decades that such production stipulations were necessary in order
to maintain local production. Before the advent of preservatives, and before the arrival
of the technology which brought scale economies with it, brewing was a relatively
localized industry which had to sell its product within a short time. It was only when the
economies of large scale brewing became evident that firms saw an economic advantage
to centralizing production and that the provincial governments began to pressure the big
brewers to produce in the province of sale.49
The Court's approach to constitutional characterization in the
interprovincial trade context is thus open to question by reference to the
general purposes which are served by the characterization of legislative
subject matters under the Constitution. My argument is that the
identification of disproportionate impact on interprovincial trade as a
constitutional subject matter is more aligned with these purposes.
In making the determination of proportionality, the courts
should consider the way in which impermissible barriers to
interprovincial trade are identified in the federal-provincial Agreement
on Internal Trade. The Agreement, in turn, draws upon the approach
taken by international trade dispute panels under the GATr, the FTA, and
NAFTA, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice respecting
permissible trade impediments under the Treaty of Rome, as well as that
48 Ibid. at 939.
49 I.J. Irvine & W.J. Sims, "Interprovincial Barriers in the Beer Trade" in K.F. Palda, ed.,
Provincial Trade Wars: Why the Blockade Must End (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1994) 1 at 5.
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of the American courts in interpreting the commerce clause of the
United States Constitution. These institutions have been attempting to
address the type of issue that should be addressed under the
interprovincial trade doctrine; that is, how to distinguish local trade
regulation from disproportionate or undue burdens on trade.
III. PROPORTIONALITY AND THE AGREEMENT ON
INTERPROVINCIAL TRADE
On 18 July 1994, the federal, provincial, and territorial
governments entered into the Agreement on Internal Trade. The
negotiations leading to the Agreement commenced in March 1993. The
primary impetus for these negotiations was the defeat in a national
referendum of the proposed constitutional amendments in the
Charlottetown Accord.SO The Charlottetown Accord contained a number
of political accords respecting Canadian economic union in general and
interprovincial trade barriers in particular. The failure of the
Charlottetown Accord was preceded by earlier attempts at constitutional
reform in the interprovincial trade area. The constitutional negotiations
eventually leading to the patriation of the Constitution Act, 1982S also
addressed trade barriers. In the end, a lack of consensus on the terms of
proposed amendments, as well as an extremely broad range of other
constitutional issues addressed in these negotiations, resulted in these
proposals falling off the table.S2
The Agreement thus illustrates an attempt to address
interprovincial trade barriers without the need for constitutional
amendment. Indeed, the Agreement goes outside of the constitutional
arena by establishing institutions and incentives for the negotiated
reduction of trade barriers. Most commentators have agreed that this
approach is preferable in that the many complex issues involved in the
interprovincial trade area are better suited to intergovernmental
50 Consensus Report on the Constitution: Charlottetown, 28 August 1992, Final Text (Ottawa:
Supply and Services Canada, 1992) [hereinafter CharlottetownAccord].
51 Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
52 For a discussion of the attempts at constitutional reform in this area, see M.J. Trebilcock &
R. Behboodi, "The Canadian Agreement on Internal Trade" in M.J. Trebilcock & D. Schwanen,
eds., Getting There: An Assessment of the Agreement on Internal Trade (Toronto: C.D. Howe
Institute, 1995) 20 at 24-33; R. Howse, Economic Union, Social Justice and Constitutional Reform:
Towards a High but Level Playing Field, (North York, Ont.: York University Centre for Public Law
and Public Policy, 1992) at 59-74; and T.J. Courchene, Economic Management and the Division of
Powers (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986) at 215-20.
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negotiations than to constitutional litigation. Without questioning this
general proposition, I shall argue in this part that there are advantages
to a consistency of approaches in the negotiation and constitutional
treatment of trade barriers. Before entering into this discussion, it is
helpful to set out the general way in which trade barriers are identified
in the Agreement.
Chapter Four of the Agreement sets out the general rules which
are to be applied, with some qualifications and exceptions, to trade
barriers in the different sectors covered by the Agreement. Article 401,
entitled "Reciprocal Non-Discrimination," requires the parties to treat
the goods from any other party no less favourably than the best
treatment it accords to its own or any other person's "like, directly
competitive, or substituted goods." Under Article 401(2), each party
must accord to persons, services, and investments of other parties
treatment no less favourable than the treatment it accords to its own or
others persons, services, and investments. Article 402 provides that the
parties shall not adopt or maintain "any measure that restricts or
prevents the movement of persons, goods, services or investments across
provincial boundaries." Under Article 403, "each party shall ensure that
any measure it adopts or maintains does not operate to create an
obstacle to internal trade."
All of the above provisions are subject to being overridden by
provincial measures which are aimed at a legitimate objective and which
do not disproportionately impede trade. According to Article 404,
where it has been established that a measure is inconsistent with Articles
401, 402, or 403, the measure may be saved where it is demonstrated
that:
(a) the purpose of the measure is to achieve a legitimate objective;
(b) the measure does not operate to impair unduly the access of persons, goods, services
or investments of a Party that meets the legitimate objective;
(e) the measure is not more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve that legitimate
objective; and
(d) the measure does not create a disguised restriction on trade.
A legitimate objective is defined in Chapter Two of the
Agreement as meaning public security and safety; public order;
protection of human, animal or plant life, or health; protection of the
environment; consumer protection; protection of the health, safety, and
well-being of workers; and affirmative action programmes for
disadvantaged groups.
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Thus, Chapter Four of the Agreement proscribes the
maintenance or imposition of barriers to interprovincial trade which
cannot be justified as the least restrictive means by which to carry out
legitimate objectives. Where a panel established under the Agreement
finds that a party has established an unjustified trade barrier, and the
party does not voluntarily remedy it, the party challenging the barrier
may suspend benefits having an equivalent effect or impose equivalent
retaliatory measures (Art. 1710).
The Agreement also contains a number of provisions aimed at
specific types of trade barriers resulting from: disharmony in standards
and regulatory measures (Art. 405); discriminatory procurement policies
(Ch. Five); investment policies (Ch. Six); the regulation of labour and
professionals- (Ch. Seven); consumer-related measures (Ch. Eight);
agricultural and food products (Ch. Nine); alcohol (Ch. Ten); natural
resources processing (Ch. Eleven); energy (Ch. Twelve);
communications (Ch. Thirteen); transportation (Ch. Fourteen); and
environmental protection (Ch. Fifteen). These provisions set out
detailed requirements aimed at the identification and negotiated
removal of trade barriers. Although they differ in detail, these
provisions adopt, either explicitly or in different terms, the same type of
proportionality requirement set out in Article 404.
The proportionality requirement in Chapter Four of the
Agreement is similar to the practice adopted in interpreting
international trade agreements to which Canada is a party. For example,
Article 401 of the Agreement adopts the national treatment and
most-favoured nation treatment principles set out in the GATT, the FTA,
and NAFTA. Ian Robinson has addressed the operation of the
proportionality requirements in these agreements as follows:
Like the Tokyo GATT and the FTA, the NAFTA recognizes a special class of
"legitimate"regulatory objectives-the "safety or the protection of human, animal or
plant life or health, the environment, or consumers"--which may be valid even if they
restrict trade. If a measure is found to be trade restrictive, a government seeking to
defend it mustfirst demonstrate that the intent of the measure was to realize one of these
"legitimate objectives." In the ara and the Tokyo GATr, if a trade-restrictive measure
passed this first hurdle, the government had to show that this measure was also
"necessary" to achieve that legitimate objective. If this second test was also met, then the
measure survives the challenge. The NAFTA increases the difficulty of meeting this second
test by requiring that governments prove that the measure chosen was the "least trade
restrictive necessary" to achieve a legitimate objective. 53
53 I. Robinson, "The NAFrA, the Side-Deals, and Canadian Federalism: Constitutional Reform
by Other Means?" in R.L. Watts & D.M. Brown, Options for a New Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1991) 193 at 197.
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The operation of the proportionality principle is illustrated in
two related applications of Article XX of the GATT to challenges to
Canadian herring and salmon processing requirements. GATT Articles
XX(b) and (g), respectively, exempt trade impeding measures which are
"necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health" and
"relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption." The first challenge was to the requirement
that Canadian salmon and herring be processed in Canada before
export. Canada argued that the processing requirement was primarily
aimed at conservation because of the need for accurate reporting
requirements. The GATT panel rejected this argument in the following
terms5 4:
To qualify under Article XX(g) exceptions for measures "relating to" conservation, a
measure must be primarily aimed at conservation.
Canadian export restrictions could not be considered to be primarily aimed at
conservation, because (a) statistical data for conservation purposes was collected on
other species without export restriction and (b) a limitation on consumption could not be
effective if only exports of unprocessed fish were restricted. 55
Subsequent to the GATT panel's report, but prior to Canada's
approval of same, Canada adopted a new requirement that all salmon
and herring be landed in Canada for inspection prior to export. Again,
the United States challenged the requirement, this time before a FTA
panel. Michael Trebilcock and Robert Howse provide the following
account of these proceedings:
Unlike the measure impugned in the earlier case, the landing requirement did not
explicitly prohibit or restrict exports of the unprocessed fish. Nevertheless, its effect was
to disadvantage American processors, because in the case of fish destined to U.S.
processing plants, they would have to be both landed and unloaded in Canada (because
of the law) and then repacked and unloaded again in the United States before processing.
The United States claimed that the measure was, in effect, a restriction on "exportation
or sale for export" (i.e. of unprocessed Canadian fish to the United States) and therefore
in violation of Article XI of the GATT. Canada argued that even if the landing
requirements were in violation of Article XI, the Article XX(g) exception applied,
because landing of the fish was necessary for accurate monitoring of the catch pursuant
to Canadian conservation programmes. The Panel found that other means less restrictive
of trade existed to achieve Canada's objectives of monitoring and compliance with its
conservation schemes, including co-operation with U.S. authorities and on-board
54 See United States v. Canada: Restrictions on Export of Unprocessed Salmon and Herring,
Complaint: 20 February 1987 (L/6132), reprinted in R.E. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law:
The Evolution of the Modem GAiT Legal System (Toronto: Butterworths, 1993) App./Pt. I at 542.
55 Ibid. at 543.
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inspection of catches and cargo, and that (at least implicitly) Canada had adopted more
restrictive means necessary for protectionist reasons. 56
The approach of the GATT and FTA panels to a claimed
justification of a trade barrier by reference to a legitimate objective is
thus to consider the availability of alternative means to carry out the
same objective. As Trebilcock and Howse state, "instead of examing the
legislative history of the measure to determine whether its primary aim
was protection of the domestic Canadian processing industry, it
considered whether other means less restrictive of trade could equally
serve the stated conservation purpose."57
This objective proportionality test is also used by the Court of
Justice of the European Communities (the "European Court of Justice")
to consider justifications of trade impeding measures under the Treaty
of Rome. Articles 30 and 34 of the Treaty of Rome prohibit, subject to
certain exceptions, quantitative restrictions on imports and exports "and
all measures having equivalent effect." There are two major
qualifications to this proscription. The first is set out in Article 36, which
permits the same type of legitimate objectives as those discussed above
in the context of the Agreement, the GATT, the FTA, and NAFTA:
The provisions of Arts. 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports,
exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public
security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of
national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archeological value; or the protection of
industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however,
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between
Member States.
The European Court of Justice has interpreted Article 36 to
permit restrictions which are supportable on the enumerated public
policy grounds provided that they use the least restrictive means to
accomplish those goals. The Court put it as follows in Campus Oil Ltd.
v. Minister for Industry and Energy:
As the Court has previously stated (see judgments of Eggers, Case 13/78 (12 October
1978), and of E.C. Commission v. France, Case 42/82 (22 March 1983), Article 36, as an
exception to a fundamental principle of the Treaty, must be interpreted in such a way that
its scope is not extended any further than is necessary for the protection of the interests
which it is intended to secure and the measures taken pursuant to that Article must not
create obstacles to imports which are disproportionate to those objectives. Measures
adopted on the basis of Article 36 can therefore be justified only if they are such as to
5 6 Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 42 at 337 [emphasis in original].
5 7 Ibid. at 336.
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serve the interest which that Article protects and if they do not restrict intra-Community
trade more than is absolutely necessary.58
The European Court of Justice has also used the proportionality
principle to consider the validity of other governmental measures which,
although they fall outside of Article 36, serve valid policy objectives. It
has done this by applying a "rule of reason" to the interpretation of the
term "measures having an equivalent effect" to quantitative restrictions
on imports in Article 30. This method of interpretation permits
disparities between the regulations of member states resulting in trade
barriers provided that they satisfy "mandatory requirements" 59 which do
not have a disproportionate impact on trade. The Court stated the rule
as follows in Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur
Branntwein:
Obstacles to movement within the Community resulting from disparities between the
national laws relating to the marketing of the products in question must be accepted in so
far as those provisions may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy
mandatory requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision,
the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defense
of the consumerf 0
Alan Dashwood has provided the following analysis of the
relationship between the rule of reason in Cassis de Dijon and other
areas of European Community law, especially Article 36:
The legal basis of justification through the satisfaction of mandatory requirements could
not be Article 36, since the Court does not have power to add to the exceptions in that
Article. And, indeed, Article 36 is not mentioned in the judgment. What the Court has
done is to interpret Article 30 in such a way as to exclude non-discriminatory provisions
necessary to satisfy mandatory requirement[s].
58 (No. 72/83), [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 544 at 570-71, citing [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. 562 and [1984] 1
C.M.L.R. 160.
59 The term "mandatory requirements" is meant to include only legislated requirements, as
opposed to "the mere exercise of executive or administrative discretion": see Trebilcock & Howse,
supra note 42 at 436, note 21.
60 (No. 120/78), [1979] E.C.R. 649 at 662 [hereinafter Cassis de Dijons]. The European Court
of Justice has apparently retracted somewhat from its original statement of the scope of prohibited
national marketing laws. In Re Keck &Anor (No. 267-68/91), [1995] 1 C.E.C. 306 at 307, the Court
upheld French legislation prohibiting the selling of goods at a loss "provided that those provisions
apply to all affected traders operating within the national territory and provided that they affect in
the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from other
member states." The Court stated, at 307, that this restriction of the type of marketing regulations
which are prohibited under Article 30 was made necessary "[i]n view of the increasing tendency of
traders to invoke art. 30 of the treaty as a means of challenging any rules whose effect is to limit
their commercial freedom even where such rules are not aimed at products from other member
states ... ... In any event, although the Court has restricted the scope of the rule, it did not indicate
that the basic method of the proportionality analysis was open to question.
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The solution adopted in Cassis de Dijon was foreshadowed by the principle in Article 3 of
the Commission's Directive 70/50 that non-discriminatory marketing rules constitute
measures having an' effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions "where the restrictive
effect of such measures on the free movement of goods exceeds the effects intrinsic to
trade rules."61
Similarly, according to Gormley:
The rule of reason is not an application of the public policy provision in the first sentence
of Article 36 EEC nor is it simply an expansion of the heads of the first sentence of Article
36. The interests or values covered by the rule of reason do not constitute a closed class
but the case-law has given a clear indication of the sort of non-discriminatory national
provisions which it will accept, provided that the conditions for acceptance are fulfilled ...
So far the Court has indicated that national measures justified in the interests of
consumer protection; the prevention of unfair commercial practices (sometimes
expressed as the promotion of fair trading or the prevention of unfair competition); the
effectiveness of fiscal supervision; environmental protection; improvement of working
conditions; the protection of public health or the promotion of culture in general may be
accepted, even though they are capable of affecting trade between Member States.
As has been indicated, measures justifiable under the rule of reason must be reasonable
and are subject to the proportionality test; that is they must not restrict trade between
Member States any more than is absolutely necessary for the attainment of the legitimate
purpose and if there are other ways, less restrictive of trade between Member States of
attaining that purpose then the measures will not be accepted. Additionally, the
measures concerned must not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a
disguised restriction on trade between Member States. 62 t
The Court's interpretation of the basic trade law principles under
the Treaty is thus to focus on two types of prohibited regulations: those
which are discriminatory, and those which are disproportionate.
Discriminatory provisions are aimed at preventing trade among Member
States. An example of a discriminatory measure arose in Schutzerband
gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft v. Weinweritriebs GmbH63 where the
European Court of Justice held that a German law setting minimum
alcohol content for imported vermouth violated Article 36. Because the
legislation in that case was aimed exclusively at imported products, it was
held to be a discriminatory trade barrier:
61 A. Dashwood, "The Cassis de Dijon Line of Authority" in Bates et aL, In Memoriam J.B.D.
Mitchell (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1983) 145 at 149, citing O.J. 1970, L13/29; and GB-Inno-BM v.
Vereniging Van De Kleinhandelaars In Tebak (No. 13/77), [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 283.
62 L.W. Gormley, ed., Introduction to the Law of the European Communities After the Coming
into force of the Single European Act (Deventer, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1989) at 389-90
[footnotes omitted].
63 (No. 59/82), [1984] 1 C.M.L.R. 319 [hereinafter Schutzerband]; see also Factortame v.
Secretary of State for Transport, [1991] 1 All E.R. 70 (H.L.), where an injunction was granted to
prevent the U.K. Parliament from enacting regulations that prohibited foreign ownership of fishing
vessels.
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It is apparent from the argument before the Court, which has not been challenged in that
respect by theplaintiff in the main action, that a provision of the importing member-State
fixing a minimum degree of alcohol only for imported vermouth prevents the marketing
of a product lawfully made in the exporting member-State, whereas it imposes no
condition in relation to the minimum content of alcohol for the marketing of similar
domestic products.... Since such a provision affects only imported products, it is of a
discriminatory nature.64
Disproportionate measures are those which, although not facially
discriminatory, have the effect of impeding trade to an extent which is
not justifiable by reference to the listed grounds in Article 36 or the
public policy grounds considered in the rule of reason. An example of a
disproportionate measure arose in Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke v. De
Smedt Pvba65 where the Court considered a Belgian decree prohibiting
the retail sale of margarine in cuboid packs. Because the prohibition
applied to imported and domestic margarine alike, it was not a facially
discriminatory measure. Nonetheless, the Court held that it was a
barrier to trade because:
[I]t is of such a nature as to render the marketing of those products more difficult or
more expensive either by barring them from certain channels of distribution or owing to
the additional costs brought about by the necessity to package the products in question in
special packs which comply with the requirements in force on the market of their
destination.66
The Belgian government sought to defend the requirement on
the grounds that it was justifiable in order to protect consumers by
preventing confusion between butter and margarine. The Court,
applying the principle that "[i]f a member-State has a choice between
various measures to attain the same objective it should choose the means
which least restricts the free movement of goods,"67 rejected this
argument:
It cannot be reasonably denied that in principle legislation designed to prevent butter and
margarine from being confused in the mind of the consumer is justified. However, the
application by one member-State to margarine lawfully manufactured and marketed in
another member-State of legislation which prescribes for that product a specific kind of
packaging such as the cubic form to exclusion of any other form of packaging
considerably exceeds the requirements of the object in view. Consumers may in fact be
protected just as effectively by other measures, for example by rules on labeling, which
hinder the free movement of goods less.68
64 Schutzerband, supra note 63 at 329.
65 (No. 261/81), [1983] 2 C.M.L.R. 496 [hereinafter WalterRau].
66 Ibid. at 508-09.
67 Ibid. at 508.
68 Ibid. at 509.
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The distinction between discriminatory and disproportionate
measures is especially relevant to the Canadian interprovincial trade
context. That distinction requires a two-step analysis. The first step is to
consider whether the local regulation is discriminatory in the sense that
it is aimed at interfering with trade among member-states. If the
regulation is discriminatory, it is inconsistent with Article 30 or 34 of the
Treaty of Rome. If the regulation is not discriminatory, its validity is
determined by reference to the justifications permitted in Article 36 (if it
is purportedly justified by reference to one of the enumerated grounds in
that Article) or the rule of reason (if it is purportedly justified by
reference to a mandatory requirement which is not included in the
enumerated grounds in Article 36). In either case, in order to justify the
regulation's impact on the movement of trade, the enacting state must
show that this impact is necessary to carry out the objective of the
regulation. These categories of cases thus resemble the type of issues at
play in the Canadian interprovincial trade context.
What the European Court of Justice treats as discriminatory
measures are similar to those provincial statutes that prohibit
transactions with persons outside the province. In both the Canadian
and European context, these measures are prohibited because they are
aimed at preventing trade among persons in the different jurisdictions.
The European Court of Justice's determination of disproportionate
measures may also be compared to those cases where the Supreme
Court of Canada has considered the application of provincial legislation
to goods with an extraprovincial destination. The approach taken by the
European Court of Justice is to evaluate the validity of local regulation
by reference to the regulation's impact on the movement of goods and
whether that impact is necessary in light of the purpose of the
regulation. The rationale for this approach is to preserve local
autonomy to the extent objectively necessary to implement valid local
objectives. In the Canadian constitutional context, the Supreme Court
of Canada has not taken these factors into account. Rather, the Court
has attempted to treat these cases as falling within the starker category
of whether the regulation is aimed at preventing the extraprovincial flow
of trade. As the above discussion of the Supreme Court of Canada case
law in this area demonstrates, the result has been a series of
irreconcilable decisions, which d6 not appear to be supportable by any
coherent principle.
The concept of proportionality is also found in American
constitutional law, where the courts have applied it to interpret Articles
VIII and IV(2)of the United States Constitution. Article VIII provides
that "Congress shall have power ... to regulate commerce with foreign
1996]
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Nations, and among the several States;" Article IV(2), the so-called
"privileges and immunities clause" states "[tihe Citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all Privileges and immunities of Citizens in the
several States."
The American courts have interpreted Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce as prohibiting state legislation that
"unduly" impedes interstate trade in light of the legislative objective. As
Hogg has noted with respect to the American law, "[t]he language of
'burdens' on interstate commerce is conventional in the United States,
where the essential problem is exactly the same, but is confronted more
openly by the courts than in Canada."69 More openly, and, I would
argue, more coherently.
Stone J. described the interpretation of state legislation's
compliance with the commerce power as follows for the United States
Supreme Court in South Carolina State Highway Department v.
Barnwell:70 "the inquiry [is] whether the state Legislature in adopting
regulations such as the present has acted within its province, and
whether the means of regulation chosen are reasonably adapted to the
end sought."
In making this determination, the Court balances the means
chosen to implement a legitimate legislative objective against its effects
on interstate trade. Thus, in Raymond Motor Transport Inc. v. Rice,71 the
Supreme Court struck down a Wisconsin regulation that prohibited the
operation of vehicles over fifty-five feet long on highways within the
state. The effect of this restriction was that the parties challenging the
legislation, who used the industry standard sixty-five foot vehicles in
surrounding states, either had to change their routes, bypassing
Wisconsin, or detach their trailers prior to entering the state. These
parties led evidence to show that there were no safety reasons which
favoured the fifty-five foot restriction. The state argued that the purpose
of the restriction was to promote highway safety, but did not offer any
evidence respecting comparative safety. Powell J. discussed the Court's
approach to the issue as follows:
In this process of "delicate adjustment," the Court has employed various tests to express
the distinction between permissible and impermissible impact upon interstate commerce,
but experience teaches that no single conceptual approach identifies all of the factors that
may bear on a particular case. Our recent decisions make clear that the inquiry
necessarily involves a sensitive consideration of the weight and nature of the state
69 See Hogg, supra note 42 at 553.
70 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
71 434 U.S. 429 (1977).
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regulatory concern in light of the extent of the burden imposed on the course of
interstate commerce. As the Court stated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142,
90 S. Ct. 844, 847, 25 LEd.2d 174 (1970):
Although the criteria for determining the validity of state statutes affecting
interstate commerce have been variously stated, the general rule that emerges
can be phrased as follows: Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate are
only incidental, itwill be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. Huron Cement Co.
v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443, 80 S. Ct. 313, 4 L.Ed.2d 852. If a legitimate local
purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the
burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local
interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact
on interstate activities.72
Similarly, in Toomer v. Witsell,73 a South Carolina statute
requiring all owners of shrimp boats to unload their catch in that state
prior to transporting the shrimp to another state was held to create an
undue burden on interstate commerce because its effect was to interfere
with the economical means of exporting directly, without unloading "the
necessary tendency of the statute is to impose an artificial rigidity on the
economic pattern of the industry."74 The Court held that the state's
justification that the loading requirement assisted tax enforcement was
insufficient because burdens on interstate commerce "should not be
approved simply because they facilitate in some measure enforcement of
a valid tax." 75
A proportionality test is also used in the interpretation of the
privileges and immunities clause. One of the provisions considered in
Toomer was the imposition of a higher tax on out-of-state commercial
shrimp fishers than on fishers resident within the state. The state sought
to justify the higher tax on the grounds that its purpose was to conserve
the shrimp supply and asserted that the fishing methods and boat sizes of
out-of-state fishers, and the greater cost of enforcing the laws against
them required the higher tax. The Court approached the issue as
follows:
But assuming such were the facts, they would not necessarily support a remedy so drastic
as to be a near equivalent of total exclusion. The State is not without power, for example,
to restrict the type of equipment used in its fisheries, to graduate license fees according to
the size of the boats, or even to charge non-residents a differential which would merely
72 Ibid. at 441-42 [emphasis added; footnotes omitted].
73 334 U.S. 385 (1947) [hereinafter Toomer].
74 Ibid. at 403-04.
75 Ibid. at 406.
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compensate the State for any added enforcement burden they may impose or any
conservation expenditures from taxes which only residents pay. We would be closing our
eyes to reality, we believe, if we concluded that there was a reasonable relationship
between the danger represented by non-citizens as a class, and the severe discrimination
practiced upon them. 76
The American constitutional jurisprudence is thus aligned with the
international trade law jurisprudence in that both look to the effect that
a domestic measure has on the flow of trade and whether that effect is
disproportionate. 77
Using the concept of disproportionality as the way to distinguish
valid local trade regulation from unjustifiable interference with trade has
thus gained wide international acceptance. The Agreement's adoption
of this principle indicates that governments in Canada recognize the
workability of that principle. Furthermore, its effective application in
Canada could have significant consequences. The examples of the
application of the proportionality principle discussed above are not just
of academic interest. Each of the trade barriers identified in those
examples has a parallel in Canada. Thus, the requirement of processing
fish products prior to export, which was found to be in violation of the
GATT and the United States Constitution, is comparable to Quebec
regulations prohibiting fish and crab caught there from being processed
in another province.78 Similarly, the Belgian prohibition on the sale of
margarine in cube form is akin to the requirement in Ontario and
Quebec that margarine must be manufactured in a different colour than
butter.79 As well, the way in which Wisconsin's restriction on the length
of vehicles operating on its highways prevented effective commercial
through traffic is similar to the effect of Ontario's vehicle length
restriction on trade with the United States and western provinces. As
Norman Bonsor explains:
In all the Western provinces and all but 4 U.S. states (Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii and
Rhode Island), maximum vehicle length has been set at 25 metres and maximum trailer
length at 53 feet. In Ontario, the maximum vehicle length is 23 metres and maximum
76 Ibid. at 398-99 [footnotes omitted]. For a discussion of the relationship between the
proportionality tests used to interpret the commerce clause, and the privileges and immunities
clause, see L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation, 1978) at 335 and
408-12.
77For a discussion on the impact of American commerce power case law on the jurisprudence
of the European Court of Justice, see Gormley, supra note 62 at 357 and 381.
78 K.F. Palda, "Why Canada Must Rid Itself of Interprovincial Trade Barriers" in Palda, ed.,
supra note 49, xi at xiii.
79 B. Prentice, "Interprovincial Barriers to Agriculture Trade," in Palda, ed., supra note 49, 83
at 88.
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trailer length is 48 feet. Qu6bec allows 51 foot trailers and the other eastern provinces
have the same standard as Ontario.
Carriers supplying services between Ontario and the west (and Ontario and the U.S.) are
thus faced with either switching equipment at the Ontario-Manitoba border or sizing the
equipment for the lowest common standard. 80
The presence of the Agreement illustrates a consensus in
Canada that barriers to trade in Canada should be identified in the same
way that barriers to trade are identified by the international community:
by reference to their disproportionate impact. My argument is that this
concept of barriers should be integrated into the Constitution to identify
the outer scope of provincial jurisdiction over intraprovincial trade.
Once it is determined that provincial legislation primarily aimed at
intraprovincial trade impedes trade to a greater extent than is necessary
to carry out the goals of the scheme, then, to that extent, the
disproportionate element is beyond provincial jurisdiction. My
argument is that disproportionate impact is consistent with the
overriding constitutional goal of protecting a proper sphere for
provincial jurisdiction in a way which is superior to the other approaches
which the Supreme Court of Canada has taken to this issue.
Having said this, it is anticipated that there could be concerns
With applying proportionality as the operative rule for the constitutional
characterization of interprovincial trade.
IV. ADDITIONAL CONCERNS
A. Criticisms of the Ancillary Doctrine
The first major conceptual concern is not directly with applying
foreign legal notions, but in defending the central role that I have
proposed for the ancillary doctrine as applied in General Motors.8 1 Hogg
argues that the approach taken in this decision "is not satisfactory":
If a provision is a rational, functional part of a federal legislative scheme, why should it be
regarded as "encroaching" or "intruding" on provincial powers? Indeed, it may be
doubted whether the provincial Legislatures would have been competent to enact the
civil remedy provision that was under attack, since its purpose was to improve the
enforcement of a federal law. The idea of encroachment or intrusion, however appealing
in common sense, does not stand up to analysis. If I am wrong on this, there still remain
80 N. Bonsor, "Big Wheels Stalling: How Bad are Barriers to Transportation Between the
Provinces?" in Palda, ed., supra note 49, 155 at 165.
81 Supra note 34.
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serious difficulties. How is the encroachment or intrusion, once found, to be measured?
And, once measured, how is the unique test for validity to be formulated for that
particular encroachment or intrusion? In my view, the General Motors approach makes
the answer to a simple question too complicated, too discretionary, and therefore too
unpredictable.
The proper course for the Court is to return to the true path marked out by Nykorak,
Papp, Zelensky and Multiple Access. Each head of legislative power, whether federal or
provincial, authorizes all provisions that have a rational connection to the exercise of that
head of power. There is no theoretical or practical need for a separate ancillary power.
The rational connection test is to be preferred to stricter alternatives, such as the "truly
necessary" or "essential" tests, simply because it is less strict. The more liberal test
respects the limits imposed by the Constitution's distribution of powers by requiring a
rational connection, but it still allows considerable leeway to the legislative judgment of
both the federal Parliament and the provincial Legislatures. It thus accords with the
refrain of this text in favour of judicial restraint. 82
Hogg's criticism is a powerful one. Because I rely quite heavily on the
Court's decision in General Motors for my argument in this article, I shall
respond to this criticism in detail.
First, Hogg argues that it is not proper to speak of a rational and
functional part of a legislative scheme encroaching or intruding on the
jurisdiction of the other level of government. But this is
question-begging. Rationality and functionality cannot be viewed in the
abstract for constitutional purposes. These concepts can only be
understood by reference to the need to confine the authority of
legislatures to their constitutional jurisdiction. For example, if a
province sought to keep the streets free of prostitution, a rational and
functional way for it to do so would be to make prostitution a criminal
offence. That the provinces cannot do this is because criminal law is
within federal jurisdiction. In other words, the requirement that an
impugned provision be rationally and functionally related to a valid
scheme is not driven by the need for legislation to contain only rational
and functional provisions for their own sake, but to ensure that the
entire legislative scheme, including the impugned provision, does not go
beyond the jurisdiction of the legislature. As a result, the focus of the
inquiry is the outer boundary of legislative jurisdiction. This necessarily
involves consideration of the competing legislative jurisdiction of the
other level of government. Therefore, if the concern of the courts is to
ensure that an otherwise valid statute does not contain provisions that
unjustifiably exceed the legislative jurisdiction under which the statute
was enacted, I would argue that it is better for the courts to face this
issue directly by acknowledging that the impugned provision does
82 Hogg, supra note 42 at 409; see also N. Finkelstein, "Case Comment" (1989) 68 Can. Bar
Rev. 802 at 817.
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intrude into the other government's jurisdiction and require the enacting
government to justify the need to do so. Professor Le Dain, as he then
was, has argued that the ancillary doctrine "permits the setting of
reasonable limits to the scope of exclusive federal jurisdiction because of
its preclusive effect, while at the same time permitting the extension of
federal jurisdiction to what is reasonably necessary by actual legislative
initiative."83
Second, Hogg argues that the proportionality test is an overly
complicated answer to a simple question and thus too unpredictable and
discretionary. It is overly complicated, according to Hogg, because it
requires the court to treat different types of intrusions differently by
reference to the degree of intrusion. Hogg would therefore replace this
with a single test of rationality and functionality. But again, it is
necessary to consider why any justification of rationality and
functionality is required. The need for justification only arises if the
impugned, provision contains a threat of extending legislative
jurisdiction. Absent this threat, there is no need to justify the degree to
which specific provisions are integrated with a statute. Thus, if the
overriding concern is to protect the integrity of competing legislative
jurisdiction, then it makes sense to consider the degree to which that
jurisdiction is threatened and adjust the level of scrutiny accordingly.
Where that threat is non-existent, no level of justification is required;
where it is marginal, a looser justification is required; where it is
significant, a higher standard must be met.
I concede that the test does not produce predictable results, but
this is because the issues which it attempts to address are complex. The
role of this test is to incorporate those issues and explicitly balance them
against each other. The result of this process of balancing cannot be
easily predicted, but that is certainly not unique to this area of
constitutional law. In this regard, it is worth comparing this balancing to
the similar balancing which is carried out under section 1 of the
Charter8 4 Under section 1, the courts are required to balance
infringements of constitutionally protected rights against the
government's interest in pursuing legislative objectives. The result of
that balance is not always predictable, but that is because the competing
interests are not open to any obvious resolution. All that can be asked
for in such a balancing exercise is that the courts include the relevant
factors in the measurement of the balance. To be fair, Hogg criticizes
83 Supra note 9 at 274 [emphasis added].
84 Supra note 43.
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the discretionary element of the section 1 balance, but he also
acknowledges that "there is merit in the frank avowal that the
guaranteed rights are not absolutes."85 I would argue that the ancillary
doctrine as expounded by the Court in General Motors contains the same
type of frank avowal that not all threatened extensions of legislative
jurisdiction are equal.
Hogg's third criticism of Dickson C.J.'s approach in General
Motors is that it is too strict. Requiring the government to justify a
legislative provision by a standard beyond the provision's rational and
functional relationship with the remainder of the statute restricts the
legislatures' freedom and is thus inconsistent with Hogg's advocacy of
judicial restraint. This criticism strongly informs the indeterminacy
criticism discussed above. The indeterminacy argument could be met by
a requirement that all legislative provisions can only be sustained where
they are truly necessary to a valid legislative scheme. Hogg's preference
for the rational and functional relationship standard is that it involves
less searching judicial review of legislation. This position on judicial
restraint pervades Hogg's treatise. Hogg argues for judicial restraint in
federalism decisions because of the indeterminate issues presented in
division of powers cases. These issues inevitably involve the exercise of
political judgment, drawing upon contested values from history, political
science, economics, and sociology. Because judges are not in as good a
position as democratically elected legislatures to incorporate these
values, the courts should generally defer to legislative choices:
One cannot say that a judge is wrong to take account of these kinds of considerations.
How else is the judge to reach a decision as to the appropriate characterization of a
statute, where conventional legal sources fail to supply the answer? But, in assessing
these kinds of criteria, the judge has little to provide guidance and may tend to assume
that his or her personal preferences are widely shared if not impliedly embodied in the
Constitution. In that sense, judicial review can never be wholly neutral, wholly divorced
from the predilections of the judges. This is one reason why in federalism cases judicial
restraint should be a governing precept. In other words, where the choice between
competing characterizations is not clear, the choice which will support the legislation is
normally to be preferred.86
Other scholars have noted the political dimensions of federalism
decisions and have also tended to argue in favour of judicial restraint.
Patrick Monahan and Paul Weiler have argued that, because of the
political nature of these decisions, the courts lack the legitimacy to make
them. According to Monahan, "federalism disputes, as to both federal
8 5 Hogg, supra note 42 at 853.
8 6 ibid. at 390.
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and provincial legislation, should be resolved through political processes.
The claim is simply that federalism issues are inescapably political and
there is no plausible reason for removing them from the political
arena."87
Similarly, Weiler argues that the courts do not have a legitimate
role in judicial review on federalism grounds and advocates the
development of doctrine which would reduce, if not eliminate the role of
the courts:
We must allow the representative governments to decide not only whether affirmative
legislative action is desirable for a social problem but also whether it is the appropriate
body to enact such legislation. The court should not have the job of making the latter,
equally political, decision....
In my view, abolition of judicial review is the ideal, but I am more concerned with
immediate practical steps towards minimizing either the incidence or the harm from
review. Instead of trying to alter the Supreme Court in ways designed to make it a
constitutional umpire, let us try to reduce as much as possible the significance of this
function in its work.8 8
There is obvious merit to the argument that, on the whole, the judiciary
is less well placed than the legislatures to carry out the balancing
required in political decisions and I do not propose to argue against
these scholars on this general point. However, it is important to
recognize that there are different types of federalism issues which come
before the courts and that the relative legitimacy of the courts and the
legislatures is not the same in each case. The concern in this article is
interprovincial trade barriers and the role of disproportionality in
provincial measures which impede trade.
One of the issues which interprovincial trade barriers raises is
the legitimacy of provincial measures that impede the trade of persons
outside their jurisdiction. The fact that provincial legislatures are
democratically accountable to their provincial constituents does not
militate in favour of judicial restraint where the issue is whether
provincial measures implement policies at the expense of persons
outside their jurisdiction. The problem of local legislatures
implementing policies at the expense of persons outside their
jurisdiction is the central point of John Hart Ely's theory of judicial
87 p.j. Monahan, "At Doctrine's Twilight: The Structure of Canadian Federalism" (1984) 34
U.T.L.J. 47 at 96.
88 P.C. Weiler, "The Supreme Court of Canada and Canadian Federalism" (1973) 11 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 225 at 244 and 246 [hereinafter "Canadian Federalism"]; see also P.C. Weiler, In the Last
Resort (Toronto: Methuen, 1974).
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review in Democracy and Distrust.89 His object is to find a democratic
justification for judicial review under the United States Constitution.
Ely views the problem of legitimacy in the same way as the Canadian
scholars: "a body that is not elected or otherwise politically responsible
in any significant way is telling the people's elected representatives that
they cannot govern as they'd like."90
Ely argues that this problem may be mitigated by restricting
judicial review to ensuring that the process of legislative decisionmaking
properly takes account of the persons subject to it. Importantly, Ely
grounds his argument in a number of United States Supreme Court
decisions interpreting the interstate commerce and privileges, and the
immunity clauses discussed in Part III, above. Ely relies upon these
decisions because they address the states' authority to pass measures
restricting the rights of out-of-state persons; Ely's interpretation of these
cases is that they "involve the protection of geographical outsiders, the
literally voteless."91 He extends the principle of these decisions to argue
that the judiciary may legitimately overturn the decisions of
democratically elected governments when governments have not
complied with their "duty of representation." 92 Judges enforce this duty,
not by questioning the substantive political choices made by the
legislature, but by ensuring "that the political process-which is where
such values are properly identified, weighed, and accommodated-was
open to those of all viewpoints on something approaching an equal
basis."93
On the whole, Canadian writers have not considered Ely's
approach to this issue, at least not for federalism issues. 94 One
exception is Weiler, who, it will be recalled, proposes that constitutional
doctrine should be aimed at reducing, if not eliminating the role of
judicial review. One of these proposals is that the courts should adopt a
89 J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1980).
90 Ibid. at 4-5.
91 Ibid. at 84.
92 Ibid. at 87.
93 Ibid. at 74 [emphasis in original].
94 Some have, however, considered Ely's argument in the Charter context: see, for example,
P.W. Hogg, "The Charter of Rights and American Theories of Interpretation" (1987) 25 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 87 at 102-08; and P.J. Monahan, Politics and the Constitution: The Charter, Federalism and
the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at 86-87 and 127-31. Monahan has
specifically argued, supra note 87 at 94-95, that a rights-based political and legal theory, including
that put forward by Ely, has no analogy to federalism.
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doctrine of concurrent operation of statutes which permits combined
federal and provincial legislation on a subject matter, provided that they
do not contain "inescapable contradiction of legal directives," in which
case, the provincial legislation should be inoperative: "[t]he only possible
exception to this logic might be the case of provincial laws burdening
interprovincial trade, and thus harming the economic interests of the
citizens in other provinces to whom the legislating province is not
electorally responsible."95
Thus, in the context of interprovincial trade barriers, there are
strong arguments against a general policy of judicial restraint on
democratic grounds. As a result, Hogg's criticism of the approach in
General Motors is not as compelling in this area.
B. The Role of Effects in Constitutional Characterization
Another conceptual problem in applying international,
European, and American trade law in the Canadian constitutional
context is that these foreign jurisdictions are primarily concerned with
the effects of local legislation on the movement of trade. Thus, the
international trade and European approach is to look to whether the
local legislation has a "disproportionate impact" on international trade.
Similarly, the American courts speak in terms of "undue burdens" on
trade. In these doctrines, the focus is on effects, while the traditional
Canadian approach has been said to be concerned with the purpose of
legislation. According to this approach, the effects of legislation are not
constitutionally relevant. As will be seen, however, the matter is not as
simple as this. Despite scholarly and judicial attempts to provide
categorical statements on the relevance of effects for constitutional
characterization, the relevance of effects is more elusive than this. The
important point is to distinguish between those effects that matter and
those that do not. Like the ancillary doctrine, what drives this
distinction is concern about the legitimacy of judicial review on
federalism grounds.
95 See "Canadian Federalism," supra note 88 at 245. It should be noted that Weiler's
argument respecting standing does not coincide with this position. He argues, at 247, that private
persons should not have standing to challenge legislation on constitutional grounds except "when
there are two contradictory statutes from contending jurisdictions and he is asking for the minimal
judicial decision about paramountcy." Strictly applied, this approach would deny private persons
the right to challenge provincial legislation on the grounds that it burdens interprovincial trade, yet,
according to Weiler, these are the only grounds upon which laws should be struck down: see supra
note 88 and accompanying text.
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In addressing the relevance of effects for the purpose of
constitutional characterization, the central problem results from the
doctrinal lexicon which uses similar phrases to describe two distinct
concepts: (i) the relevance of legislation's "effects" for the purpose of
determining its pith and substance; and (ii) the "incidental effects" of
legislation on matters outside of the legislature's authority.
In determining whether legislation is in relation to a federal or
provincial head of power, the courts must determine the subject matter
of the legislation. Hogg has recited the various articulations of this
process as follows:
Laskin says it is a "distillation of the constitutional value represented by the challenged
legislation"; Abel says it is "an abstract of the statute's content"; Lederman says it is "the
true meaning of the challenged law"; Mundell says it is the answer to the question, "what
in fact does the law do, and why?"; Beetz J. says it is "a name" for "the content or subject
matter" of the law; other judges have sometimes said that it is the "leading feature" or
"true nature and character" of the law, but usually they have described it as "the pith and
substance" of the law. The general idea of these and similar formulations is that it is
necessary to identify the dominant or most important characteristic of the challenged
law.9 6
As can be seen from the above list, some descriptions of this
determination include a consideration of the effects of legislation, and
some do not. Thus, Mundell's question of what the law "does" requires
an investigation of how the law will actually work, while Abel's reference
to an abstract of the statute's content will not require this. Professor Le
Dain, as he then was, put the argument against the relevance of effects
for the purposes of determining pith and substance as follows:
It may be argued thalt legislative purpose or object should be of little consequence, that it
is effects that matter, and that the constitution should be regarded as permitting certain
results to be achieved by provincial legislation and certain results by federal legislation.
But the constitution is not really concerned with specific legislative results except insofar
as they reflect general legislative concerns or purposes. It is concerned with the
distribution of jurisdiction to pursue a variety of legislative purposes in broad areas of
constitutional responsibility. Except insofar as effect may throw light on the area of
legislative concern that is truly in contemplation it only becomes material in the case of
operational conflict with valid federal legislation. No matter how great the effect, if it be
incidental or consequential, it cannot give the legislation its character for purposes of
jurisdiction. If it be the immediate, direct and intended effect of the legislation, then it is
certainly an important, and often the most important, factor in determining that
character.9 7
Le Dain's discussion is revealing in that he starts with the
premise that effects are not relevant; he then qualifies that position by
96 Hogg, supra note 42 at 377 [footnotes omitted].
97 See Le Dain, supra note 9 at 303-04.
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stating that "incidental or consequential" effects cannot give legislation
its purpose; and finally concludes by saying that the "immediate, direct
and intended" effects of legislation may be determinative of
constitutionality. It is revealing because, although he argues that effects
are irrelevant, Le Dain effectively concedes that effects must be
considered by the courts. Otherwise, there is no 'way of determining
whether these effects are incidental or consequential, on the one hand,
or immediate, direct, and intended on the other.
Hogg addresses the relevance of the actual effects of a statute in
the context of colourability:
In characterizing a statute-identifying its "matter" or "pith and substance"-a court will
always consider the effect of the statute, in the sense that the court will consider how the
statute changes the rights and liabilities of those who are subject to it. This simply
involves understanding the terms of the statute, and that can be accomplished without
going beyond the four corners of the statute.98
Like Le Dain, Hogg thus questions the importance of effects in a
way that leaves open more questions than it answers. Hogg defines
effects as being how the statute changes rights and liabilities. In one
sense, this definition could encompass a very wide inquiry of what
persons would be permitted or required to do were the statute not
enacted. But Hogg also implies a much narrower meaning of the inquiry
into effects, one that includes only an interpretation of the legislation,
without reference to anything beyond its four corners. This limited
sense of the relevance of effects is repeated in Hogg's discussion of pith
and substance where he treats effects as being irrelevant:
It is important to recognize that this "pith and substance" doctrine enables one level of
government to enact laws with substantial impact on matters outside its jurisdiction. The
levy of the tax in 'Bank of Toronto v. Lambe was, after all, a significant exercise of
legislative power over the banks; but because the law was characterized as "in relation to"
taxation (its pith and substance or matter), it could validly "affect" banking. There are
many examples of laws which have been upheld despite their "incidental" impact on
matters outside the enacting body's jurisdiction.9 9
Like Le Dain's analysis, Hogg's discussion of "effects" (or, in the
latter passage, "impact") permits an extremely wide role for
consideration of effects but then cuts that role down by using the term
"effect" (or "impact") to include only incidental effects. The confusion
arises because these writers use the terms "effects" and "incidental
effects" interchangeably. However, there is a fundamental distinction
98 Hogg, supra note 42 at 385.
99 Ibid. at 378-79.
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between the two. The effect of the law has to be taken into account to
determine its pith and substance, or dominant characteristic. Thus, both
Hogg and Le Dain explicitly acknowledge that it is relevant. In this
sense, I do not think that the above quotations are inconsistent with
Lederman's argument that consideration of effects is inseparable from
the consideration of purposes to determine pith and substance:
In addition to speaking of the object or purpose of a rule, we may also speak of its
intention and of its effects or consequences. But all these words lead us back to the one
primary problem, the full or total meaning of the rule. There is an essential unity here
that defies these grammatical attempts at separation. A rule of law expresses what
should be human action or conduct in a given factual situation. We assume enforcement
and observance of the rule and hence judge its meaning in terms of the consequences of
the action called for. It is the effects of observance of the rule that constitute in part its
intent, object, or purpose. Certainly the total meaning of the rule cannot be assessed
apart from these effects.100
In the same vein, Dickson C.J., in R. v. Big M Drug Mart, a
Charter decision in which he addressed the need for consistent
characterization of legislation for division of powers and Charter
purposes, said that purpose and effects are inseparable concepts:
All legislation is animated by an object the legislature intends to achieve. This object is
realized through the impact produced by the operation and application of the legislation.
Purpose and effect respectively, in the sense of the legislation's object and its ultimate
impact, are clearly linked, if not indivisible. Intended and actual effects have often been
looked to for guidance in assessing the legislation's object and thus, its validity.101
Assessing effects is thus a necessary element of constitutional
characterization. At the same time, legislation cannot be struck down
simply because it affects matters which are beyond the legislature's
jurisdiction. This is because the effects of legislation are not
self-contained: there may be a wide range of effects resulting from
legislation, some unintended, and some only remotely attributable to the
statute. It is not possible to pass legislation which will only have effects
in the enacting legislature's area of jurisdiction. A simpler lexicon would
be to distinguish between relevant effects and irrelevant effects. Instead,
the latter have been classified as incidental effects. Whatever the name
given to these irrelevant effects, the function served by the concept of
incidental effects is to permit the court to cut off the inquiry into the
effects of legislation in a way that is constitutionally manageable.
100 "Classification of Laws and the British North America Act" in.W.R. Lederman, ed., The
Courts and the Canadian Constitution (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1964) 177 at 187.
101 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 313 [hereinafter Big M Drug Mart].
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Seen this way, the concept of incidental effects in constitutional
law performs the same function as the concept of remoteness in
contracts and forseeability in torts. It is employed as a means of limiting
the judicial inquiry into the chain of causation caused by the enactment
of legislation. In other words, in characterizing a law for constitutional
purposes, courts will consider the types of effects which the legislature
did foresee, or should have foreseen, when passing a law. The court will
hold the legislature responsible for those effects. The legislature will not
have to justify all the other effects that the law can or may cause. These
other effects will be considered incidental to the principal effects of
legislation and the courts will not inquire into them. In other words,
incidental effects are those effects which the courts will not consider in
determining the constitutionality of legislation.
The important point here is that the function of the incidental
effects doctrine is to provide a check on the range of the judicial inquiry.
The larger the category of effects which are characterized as incidental
(or irrelevant), the greater the scope given to the legislature. In
considering the relative importance of considering effects, one is
therefore driven to a consideration of the relative legitimacy of judicial
review on federalism grounds. Where, like Hogg, one takes the position
that judicial restraint should be the operative posture, one would be
more inclined to argue that the range of *effects that the court should
take into account should be restricted; put another way, there is a
greater tendency to label effects as incidental effects, i.e., those effects
which the court should not take into account when reviewing
legislation. 102
On the other hand, where one is less concerned with the
legitimacy of judicial review, one would be more prepared to expand the
scope of effects that the courts should take into account in determining
the constitutionality of legislation. Thus, for example, Lederman, who
admits to a larger role given to the relevance of effects, is less concerned
about limiting the role of the judiciary in federalism cases:
Of course the value assumptions of the judges will enter into their decisions. We would
complain if this were not so. They must weigh such matters as the relative values of
nation-wide uniformity versus regional diversity, the relative merit of local versus central
administration, and the justice of minority claims, when provincial or federal statutes are
challenged for validity under the established division of powers. Inevitably, widely
prevailing beliefs in the country about these issues will be influential and presumably the
102 For a discussion of the way in which the Australian courts have exercised judicial
deference to legislative choices in the federalism context by not enquiring into the effects of
legislation to determine consititutional jurisdiction, see: C.D. Gilbert, Australian and Canadian
Federalism, 1867-1984 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1986) at 7-27.
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judges should strive to implement such beliefs. Inevitably there will be some tendency for
them to identify their own convictions as those which generally prevail or which at least
are the right ones. On some matters there will not be an ascertainable general belief
anyway. In the making of these very difficult decisions of relative values, policy decisions
if one prefers that word, all that can rightly be demanded of judges is straight thinking,
industry, good faith, and a capacity to discount their own prejudices with due humility.103
It is also worth pointing out that the importance that these
effects have played in two recent cases respecting the constitutional duty
on provinces to recognize each other's judicial processes: Morguard
Investments Ltd. v. De SavoyelO4 and Hunt v. T&N PLC.105 In Morguard,
the Court held that, as a general rule, judgments of one province are
enforceable in other provinces. In Hunt, the Court held that provincial
legislation cannot prohibit the removal from the province of business
documents that are required pursuant to judicial processes outside the
province. Although in Morguard the Court expressly refrained from
stating that mutual recognition was a binding constitutional principle, in
Hunt, La Forest J. stated that the Morguard principle is a constitutional
one
and, as such, is beyond the power of provincial legislatures to override. This does not
mean, however, that a province is debarred from enacting any legislation that may have
some effect on litigation in other provinces or indeed from enacting legislation respecting
modalities for recognition of judgments of other provinces. But it does mean that it must
respect the minimum standards of order and fairness addressed in Morguard.106
Thus, in Morguard and Hunt, the Court took an approach to
constitutional jurisdiction that requires consideration of rules of order
and fairness. The principles of order and fairness cannot be adequately
considered if the effects of legislation could not be taken" into account.
Indeed, there are significant parallels between the requirements of order
and fairness in Morguard and Hunt and the role of proportionality
advanced in this paper.
As mentioned in Part III, above, 107 the European Court of
Justice has adopted the rule that, absent a demonstrable justification,
goods lawfully produced and marketed in a member-state may be
lawfully marketed in another member-state. Morguard and Hunt may be
103 Supra note 11 at 619-20.
104 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 [hereinafterMorguard].
105 [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289 [hereinafter Hunt].
106 Ibid. at 324. La Forest J. stated in Morguard, supra note 104 at 1100-01, that some writers
have suggested that mutual recognition was within Parliament's jurisdiction under ,oao, but stated
that "[t]he present case was not, however, argued on that basis, and I need not go that far."
107 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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used in support of the adoption of a similar position in Canada. Thus, in
Hunt, La Forest J. made the following observation respecting the
transaction costs of provincial legislation which does not recognize the
judicial processes of other provinces:
When one considers that Ontario and Quebec are the headquarters for many of the
largest corporations in this country, many of which will properly be subject to tort and
other actions in other provinces, the impact would be serious. The essential effect then,
and indeed the barely shielded intent, is to impede the substantive rights of litigants
elsewhere. It would force parties to conduct litigation in multiple fora and compel more
plaintiffs to choose to litigate in the courts of Ontario and Qu6bec. Other provinces
could, of course, follow suit. It is inconceivable that in devising a scheme of union
comprising a common market stretching from sea to sea, the Fathers of Confederation
would have contemplated a situation where citizens would be effectively deprived of
access to the ordinary courts in their jurisdiction in respect of transactions flowing from
the existence of that common market. The resultant higher transactional costs for
interprovincial transactions constitute an infringement on the unity and efficiency of the
Canadian marketplace, as well as unfairness to the citizen.108
Many of the statements made in the above passage are
analogous to the reasons in support of mutual provincial recognition of
production and marketing standards. Thus, for example, La Forest J.
refers to the likely effect of laws prohibiting mutual recognition of
judicial processes as leading to the commencement of duplicative and
inefficient litigation in many provinces. Similarly, local production and
packaging requirements have the effect, as the United States Supreme
Court noted in Toomer, of imposing "an artificial rigidity on the
economic pattern of the industry."109 Further, the Supreme Court of
Canada's analysis goes beyond providing analogical reasons for its
application in the interprovincial trade context; it is premised upon a
notion of interprovincial trade, going so far as to describe the legislation
as "an infringement of the unity and efficiency of the Canadian
marketplace." In my submission, Morguard and Hunt ought to be relied
upon in support of a general constitutional doctrine that a province is
required to recognize other provincial standards unless it can
demonstrate good grounds not to do so. Absent such grounds, a failure
to recognize extraprovincial standards should be considered an
unconstitutional barrier to interprovincial trade.
Accordingly, it is incorrect to say that, in all cases, effects should
either be ignored or be the. centrepiece of constitutional
characterization. The question is what effects should be taken into
account and why? As I have argued above in the context of the ancillary
108 Supra note 105 at 330.
109 Supra note 73 at 403.
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doctrine, there are strong reasons why courts should not defer to the
legislature when deciding the issue of whether the legislature has
imposed a trade barrier against persons outside the court's jurisdiction.
As the decisions in Morguard and Hunt illustrate, effects must be taken
into account where the issue is whether the provincial legislature has met
the requisite standards of order and fairness in its relations with other
provinces.
The pith and substance doctrine thus does not pose
insurmountable conceptual problems in applying international,
European, and American trade law concepts to Canadian constitutional
trade jurisprudence because these foreign sources are more effects-
based than purpose-based. Although it is fair to say that, as a matter of
practice, Canadian courts have focused on purpose more than effect,
they have not always done so. Further, the extent to which effects
should be considered is very much a function of the strength of the
argument in favour of judicial review. Where, as in the context of
interprovincial trade barriers, there is a stronger justification for judicial
review on federalism grounds than in other areas, judicial scrutiny of
effects is less problematic. Again, not all effects can be taken into
account; some will be incidental (or irrelevant). But the courts should
not be reluctant to focus their inquiry on the effects of legislation on
interprovincial trade by falling into the trap of labelling all effects as
incidental. The courts should articulate a standard, such as remoteness
or some other notion, in order to provide direction as to what type of
effects should be considered and what type should not.
C. The Analogy of Provinces to Independent States
When discussing the functional compatibility of these different
areas to the division of powers over trade, the focus moves from the
conceptual issue of whether the ideas used in these other forums can be
logically integrated into Canadian jurisprudence to the question of
whether they should be. This introduces the larger question of the
relative values at stake in furthering the Canadian economic union.
That question has been extensively canvassed in the literature and I will
not attempt to summarize it here. Most of that literature was prepared
in the context of proposed constitutional amendments respecting
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interprovincial trade.110 As this article addresses interprovincial trade
under the existing Constitution, I propose to look at a more focused
point, and that is whether using trade law doctrine is consistent with
other constitutional values.
The use of international trade law as a paradigm for
interprovincial trade has been criticized by some commentators of the
Agreement on Interprovincial Trade. The argument has been made that
provinces should not be analogized with independent states. According
to Armand de Mestral:
The underlying assumption appears to be that the provinces are totally independent
sovereign actors and that it is appropriate for them to make mutual concessions on
interprovincial trade barriers comparable to concessions made by governments in the
GATr or the NAFrA. I find this truly extraordinary, and it is all the more extraordinary that
the federal government should be aiding and abetting the process. This, in my view, can
only legitimate the view of the federal government's role that is widely held in nationalist
circles in Quibec. It is a view that I consider to be in the broad sense
unconstitutional.1 1 1
Similarly, David Cohen argues that the Agreement adopts the following
"provincialist" view with which he disagrees:
In the end, the provincialist argues that the citizens of provinces deserve at least the same
degree of respect within interprovincial trade agreements as do citizens of states in
international trade agreements ...
Most remarkable and disconcerting of all is that the Canadian Internal Trade Agreement,
an intra-national agreement supposedly representing the collective interests of all
Canadians, should look so much like, but which perhaps accomplishes so much less than,
the North American Free Trade Agreement-an international agreement between three
sovereign nations motivated only by national self-interest. 
1 1 2
Both of these writers thus question the premise that provinces
should be the principal actors involved in the identification and
negotiation of interprovincial trade barriers. Rather, this matter should
be left to Parliament which, presumably, should legislatively eradicate
these barriers. The difficulty with this argument is two-fold.
110 For a cross-section of literature addressing proposed constitutional change in this area, see
I. Bernier et al., "The Concept of Economic Union in International and Constitutional Law," in M.
Krasnick, ed., Perspectives on the Canadian Economic Union (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1986) 35; N. Silzer & M. Krasnick, "The Free Flow of Goods in the Canadian Economic Union," in
Krasnick, ed., 155; Courchene, supra note 52; M.J. Trebilcock et al., eds., Federalism and the
Canadian Economic Union (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983); and Howse, supra note 52.
111 "A Comment" in Trebilcock & Schwanen, eds., supra note 52, 95.
112 "The Internal Trade Agreement: Furthering the Canadian Economic Disunion?" (1995)
25 Can. Bus. L.J. 257 at 271 and 279.
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First, the goal of the Agreement is not to restrict provincial
sovereignty over matters within the provinces' jurisdiction. This would
involve an increase in Parliament's authority and thus require
constitutional amendment, which appears to be the ultimate goal of
these authors. Thus, for example, Cohen argues: "Put most bluntly, too
many provincialists believe, either as politicians, producers or consumers
(but, in my view, mostly as provincial politicians) that they will be better
off if they can exercise power at the provincial, regional or even local
level." 113
The argument that power should not be exercised at the local
level is simply not realistic. Constitutional amendment has been
attempted without success in this area. To reject efforts to address the
interprovincial trade issues by non-constitutional means is effectively to
accept that nothing will be done. Further, it is worth pointing out that
studies of interprovincial trade barriers have indicated that Parliament
has been at least as willing as provincial legislatures to impose trade
barriers to interprovincial trade. According to Trebilcock and
Behboodi:
Moreover, Canadian estimates previously undertaken of reductions in national income
from internal barriers to trade found that federal policies (not provincial policies)-such
as the National Energy Policy (NEP) and the national tariff, federal agricultural marketing
board schemes, and regionally differentiated unemployment insurance
entitlements--accounted for a large proportion of the losses.
114
In this regard, it should also be pointed out that the adoption of
proportionality as the operative principle by which to measure
interprovincial trade barriers does not involve a transfer of jurisdiction
between Parliament and the provincial legislatures. As has been seen,
although the case law is clear that provinces do not have constitutional
jurisdiction to enact trade barriers-these barriers would be in relation
to interprovincial trade and commerce-the problem has been in
characterizing trade barriers for constitutional purposes. In making that
characterization, the courts have been clear that provincial regulation
over local trade is constitutionally permissible and that such regulation
will necessarily have an effect on interprovincial trade. The Agreement
presents the opportunity to use proportionality as a conceptual tool to
113 Ibi. at 279.
114 Supra note 52 at 23; see also J. Whalley, "Induced Distortions of Interprovincial Activity:
An Overview of Issues;" and J.R.S. Prichard & J. Benedickson, "Securing the Canadian Economic
Union: Federalism and Internal Barriers to Trade" in Trebilcock et al., eds., supra note 110, 1; Silzer
& Krasnick, supra note 110 at 158; and C. Green, "Agricultural Marketing Boards in Canada: An
Economic and Legal Analysis" (1983) 33 U.T.L.J. 407 at 423, note 21.
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isolate disproportionate trade barriers as a discrete constitutional
subject matter in a way which permits provincial regulatory authority to
the extent necessary to carry out provincial ends. The value of the
Agreement is thus that it assists in the identification of trade barriers by
reference to the proportionality principle.
Second, the analogy between provinces and independent states
with respect to the reduction of trade barriers is historically supportable.
The issue of trade among and between the provinces is older than
Confederation. Indeed, structuring an arrangement through which
interprovincial trade could be developed and maintained between the
provinces was one of the main reasons why Nova Scotia and New
Brunswick entered into discussions with Upper and Lower Canada to
form a political association. W.A. Mackintosh has summarized the
economic context and motivations of the colonial provinces in the 1860s
as follows:
At the outset the Dominion, though united politically, was economically made up of two
groups of provinces, isolated from each other and lacking common economic life though
sharing some common economic problems. Cast adrift twenty years earlier by the
adoption of free trade in Great Britain, they had been rescued for the time being by rising
prices, a high rate of investment, and by the United States market available to them
through the Reciprocity Treaty. Now, without the benefit of that Treaty, they were
fearful of the results of the loss of the United States market.
From the point of view of economic development much was hoped from Confederation.
It was expected that the whole, economically and politically, would be found to be greater
than the sum of its parts. A larger unit of government promised broader financial
resources and the greater borrowing power necessary to carry out still more ambitious
railway policies. It was hoped that the new Dominion would in some measure find within
itself a circulation of trade which might compensate for the loss of free access to the
United States market. This hoped-for integration within a national economy-a
strengthening of internal trade to replace weakened external trade found expression in
the repeated references to interprovincial trade.115
Similarly, Trebilcock and Behboodi observe:
The original Confederation compact, even if partly motivated by considerations of
political and cultural autonomy and national security, also recognised as essential for the
realisation of these goals the development of a viable integrated economy on an east-west
axis north of the forty-ninth parallel. 1 6
Much of the Confederation negotiations focused on the extent to
which an economic association among the provinces required political
115 The Economic Background of Dominion-Provincial Relations, reprinted in J.H. Dales, ed.,
Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart,
1964) App. III at 19-20 [hereinafter Rowell-Sirois Report].
116 Supra note 52 at 20.
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integration. The two Maritime provinces, reluctant to lose their political
independence by joining with the Canadian provinces, advocated a
Zollveriein, or customs union, which would be less politically integrated
than the proposed confederation. On each occasion this position was
advanced, John A. Macdonald rejected it on behalf of his Upper
Canadian delegation. At the 1864 Quebec Conference, Macdonald
argued that "[i]t was impossible to have a Zollverein. We must continue
to have hostile tariffs unless we have a political union."117 Macdonald's
reference to a Zollverein is instructive in that it situates Confederation in
the context of the international trade relations and institutions of its era.
Trebilcock and Howse provide the following account of "the
hey-day of free trade" which peaked in the period 1850 to 1885:
[B]y the mid-nineteenth century only national frontiers remained as effective barriers to
trade ... Nation-building itself was in part an effort to ensure free trade where such had
never existed before: the dismantling of internal tolls and levies was an essential
precondition to industrial development in the European economies.
By the mid-nineteenth century, then, most of the advanced Europeans countries had
established free trade within their borders. But many nations continued to practice
internationally what they had eschewed internally protection (trade barriers) continued
between nations as they vied for wealth and power in international relations. The first
major break with these mercantilist-protectionist policies of the past came in Britain with
the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, spearheaded by Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel, a
late convert to the cause of trade liberalisation, and Lord Cobden .... The repeal of the
Corn Laws was quickly followed by the unilateral removal or reduction of hundreds of
tariffs on most imported goods, ushering in, in Britain, a period of resolute commitment
to the principle of free trade that extended into the early years of this century.
Britain also, over the course of the century, negotiated a number of free trade treaties
with other countries, beginning with the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty of 1860 with France.
France in turn, in 1862, negotiated a comprehensive trade treaty with the Zollverein, the
German Customs Union, as well as with a host of other European nations in the
following decade. These treaties were notable for their espousal of the Most Favoured
Nation (MFN) principle, which later became the cornerstone of the GATT. Under this
principle, countries negotiating trade concessions with one another agreed that they
would extend to each other any more favourable concessions that each might
subsequently negotiate with third countries. The MFN principle encouraged
multilateralism while discouraging trade discrimination, and because of its presence in
most French treaties, free trade swept Europe during the 1860s.
118
Thus, to a large extent, Canadian federalism was attributable to
the desire of the provinces to have an institution through which the
provinces could establish freer trade amongst themselves. Furthermore,
117 G.P. Browne, Documents on the Confederation of British North America (Toronto:
McClelland & Stewart, 1969) Doc. No. 32, Notes of the Qu6bec Conference (11 October 1864) at
96; discussion of the Maritime position is found at xx-xxi.
118 Supra note 42 at 18.
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the modalities through which this freer trade would be implemented has
always been strongly influenced by the modalities adopted
internationally. It is therefore appropriate that issues respecting
interprovincial trade should continue to be influenced by international
trade models.
D. Remedies Under the Agreement
It may also be argued that the Agreement should be the only
means by which trade barriers are addressed in Canada, that is, that the
Courts should leave this matter to the experts and political institutions
operating under the Agreement.119 This argument both overestimates
the effectiveness of the Agreement and underestimates the role of
constitutional adjudication in this area.
The Agreement has been recognized as an important first step
towards addressing systematically interprovincial trade barriers. It has,
however, also been subject to extensive criticism among commentators
who question its effectiveness by reference to the many areas of trade
exempted from the Agreement, such as agricultural quotas, energy and
financial services,120 the lack of binding enforcement powers,121 and the
absence of procedures for the harmonization of provincial measures
which fail to facilitate the movement of trade.1 22 These limitations have
been discussed elsewhere and I will not address them here. The one
issue I will address goes to the Agreement's remedies for
non-compliance.
The remedial procedures in the international arrangements
discussed above provide a range of alternatives. These options range
from that set out in the GATT system, which only permits States to
complain about non-compliance and relies principally upon moral
119 See Swinton, supra note 44 at 155-68; and K. Swinton, "Courting Our Way To Economic
Integration: Judicial Review and the Canadian Economic Union" (1995) 25 Can. Bus. L.J. 280 at
298-302. Although Swinton does not make this specific argument, she has been generally critical of
arguments that the Supreme Court of Canada should provide a more functional approach to the
issue of constitutional jurisdiction over trade.
120 See Trebilcock & Behboodi, supra note 52 at 85.
121 R. Howse, "Between Anarchy and the Rule of Law: Dispute Settlement and Related
Implementation Issues in the Agreement on Internal Trade" in Trebilcock & Schwanen, eds., supra
note 52, 170.
122 A. Easson, "Harmonization of Legislation: Some Comparisons between the Agreement on
Internal Trade and the EEC Treaty" in Trebilcock & Schwanen, eds., supra note 52, 119.
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suasion for its enforcement; 123 to NAFTA, which permits some private
parties to enforce some of its provisions and obtain damages for
non-compliance; 124 to the Treaty of Rome, which permits directly
affected private persons to challenge and have rendered inoperative
123 The following discussions respecting the enforcement of the rATT in this note, and
respecting the FrA, supra note 5 and NAFrA, supra note 6, are taken principally from Trebilcock &
Howse, supra note 42, c. 15; see also, in this regard, Hudec, supra note 54.
The GATr contains a large number of dispute resolution procedures, usually involving different
avenues through which contracting parties may informally settle disputes using the GATr as a forum,
not adjudicator. Only when this process has not led to a resolution may a contracting
party-non-parties do not have standing to raise complaints-request conciliation. Where
consultation and conciliation fail, a contracting party may bring the matter before the GATr Council
of Representatives (Council) and request that a panel investigate the dispute. The Chair of the
panel submits its report to the Council. The Council may then either adopt or block the report.
Prior to the Uruguay Round Understanding of 19 December 1993, a consensus which included the
party against whom the complaint was made had to approve the report for its adoption. The rule is
now that a consensus is required to block approval of the report. The effect of adopting a report is
described by Trebilcock & Howse at 393-94, as follows:
Because a report is adopted does not mean that its recommendations and rulings are
automatically followed. Article XXIII:2 provides for the authorization of the suspension of
concessions by one Party if another has nullified or impaired benefits accruing to the former
under the Agreement .... Typically, implementation relies on the moral suasion of a
recommendation by the Council (pursuant to a report), which can direct a Contracting Party
to withdraw or modify a measure (if the measure was found GATr-"illegal"), or to take some
other action to restore the balance of concessions (if a measure was found to be rATr-
"legal" but to have nullified benefits reasonably expected under the Agreement). The
Council can also seek to ensure compliance by regulatory monitoring whether or not a
country has complied.
124 The GATr dispute resolution mechanism of consultation, negotiation, and panels is also
used in the FTA and NAFrA. The general dispute resolution procedure of the FrA, Chapter 18, which
is adopted with some modifications in NAFrA, establishes the Canada-United States Trade
Commission (Commission) which meets at the request of either of the parties where they have been
unable to resolve a dispute. The parties may request the establishment of a panel, whose Chair is
chosen by the Commission, to investigate the complaint and prepare a report. According to
Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 42 at 401 [footnotes omitted]:
Once the Commission has received the final report, it is to agree on a resolution of the
dispute in question "normally" in conformity with the recommendations of the panel.
"Whenever possible", this resolution is to be the non-implementation or withdrawal of
measures not conforming with or causing nullification or impairment of benefits accruing
under the FrA. If the Commission cannot reach agreement within 30 days of the receipt
of the final report, or if a Party refuses to comply with the findings of a panel under the
binding arbitration provisions of Art. 1806, then the other Party may suspend the
application of equivalent benefits to that Party.
One significant development in NAFrA is that a NAFTA investor who alleges that a host
government has violated an obligation of the investment provisions (Chapter 11), including the
principles of national treatment and most favoured nation treatment, may seek arbitration,
including a claim for damages, an award of which is enforceable in domestic courts.
[VOL. 34 No. 2
1996] Barriers to Interprovincial Trade
national laws which are inconsistent with the Treaty;125 to the United
States Constitution, which is enforced by private persons and with which
all laws in that country must comply.
The Agreement goes further than the GATT and NAFTA in
permitting private persons to initiate challenges to measures which are
inconsistent with it, albeit subject to meeting procedural and standing
requirements. However, unlike the Treaty of Rome and the United
States Constitution, the remedy for non-compliance is not to strike down
inconsistent measures. Rather, it adopts the more restricted and
state-centred remedy of permitting an aggrieved jurisdiction to impose
retaliatory measures against a non-complying party.
The fact that the Agreement does not purport to override
governmental measures which are inconsistent with it is not surprising.
Governments, who are the parties to the Agreement, do not have legal
authority to bind legislatures. Accordingly, they cannot make legislation
125 European Community law is interpreted by the European Court of Justice which, pursuant
to Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
concerning the interpretation of the Treaty, the validity and interpretation of acts of Community
institutions, and the interpretation of statutes of bodies established by the Council of Ministers.
National courts are to determine whether national laws are in compliance with Community law, as
interpreted by the European Court of Justice. In practice, this formal division of authority is not so
neatly separated. As Gormley points out supra note 62 at 316:
It has to be said, though, that whilst the Court in an Article 177 ruling will not declare a
national law or act incompatible with Community law but leaves this to the national court
concerned the Court of Justice's rulings are frequently couched in such terms that the
conclusion that the national law cannot be upheld is glaringly obvious. If a Member State
does not then take steps to change its national law or practices, the Commission may well
bring infringement proceedings under Article 169 EEC. It should be noted that it is not
enough that the national lav becomes effectively unenforceable; there is a clear duty to
repeal or amend the offending provisions in the interests of transparency and legal
certainty.
The European Court of Justice has interpreted European law to provide, under certain
circumstances, enforceable rights of persons to challenge the compliance of national laws with
Community laws. The Court put it as follows in Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der
Belastingen (No. 26162), [1963] E.C.R. 1 at 12:
[T]he Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which
the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit in limited fields ... Community law
therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon
them rights which become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only where
they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty
imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon the Member States and
upon the institutions of the Community.
The right to enforce treaty provisions which are incompatible with domestic law arises wh'en
the rights set out therein are found to have "direct effect," i.e, according to Gormley at 334:
if the obligation imposed on Member States is (A) clear and precise and (B) unconditional
and, if implementing measures are provided for, (C) the Community Institutions or the
Member States are not allowed any margin of discretion.
See also Gormley at 334-38.
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subordinate to the Agreement. This could only be effectively carried out
through constitutional amendment.1 26 As a result, the only way in which
interprovincial trade barriers may be struck down is if they were found to
be unconstitutional.
Having said this, the adoption of retaliation as a remedy for a
breach of the Agreement is somewhat unusual in light of the
constitutional restrictions on provincial legislatures. As de Mestral
points out, the exercise of this remedy would probably be
unconstitutional.1 27 This is because provincial legislatures are not
constitutionally entitled to pass laws that are in relation to either
interprovincial trade or extraprovincial rights.
This leads to a more fundamental constitutional issue: is the law
at which the retaliation is aimed also unconstitutional? 128 Consider the
scenario where a panel established under the Agreement concludes that
a provincial measure cannot be saved under Article 404(d) of the
Agreement because it "create[s] a disguised restriction on trade."
Provinces do not, of course, have constitutional jurisdiction to impose
disguised trade barriers. Thus, when provincial legislation may be
characterized as being aimed at interprovincial transactions, the result is
that the law is unconstitutional. A problem may also arise if a provincial
measure is found not to be in compliance with the proportionality
requirement in Article 404. The result in that case is that the measure
impedes trade more than is necessary to implement a legitimate
126 For a discussion, see K. Swinton, "Law, Politics, and the Enforcement of the Agreement
on Internal Trade" in Trebilcock & Schwanen, eds., supra note 52, 196.
1 2 7 Supra note 111 at 95; see also Cohen,supra note 112.
128 The Agreement contains a number of other notions which are anomalous from a
constitutional perspective. For example, the list of legitimate objectives in Chapter Two includes a
number of matters which are, in whole, or in part, outside of Parliament's jurisdiction, such as
consumer protection. The result is that the federal government could not constitutionally rely upon
this legitimate objective in defending an argument that one of its measures contains a trade barrier.
Almost all of the other legitimate objectives in Chapter Two are areas in which both levels of
government have some constitutional jurisdiction. For example, the legitimate objectives of the
protection of the health, safety, and well-being of workers, and affirmative action are only in federal
jurisdiction to the extent that they are a part of management of federal undertakings. The
legitimate objective of protecting the environment is in federal jurisdiction to the extent that, in any
given case, the measure adopted to protect the environment involves matters which have attained a
"national dimension." The remaining legitimate objectives, le., public security and safety, public
order, and the protection of human, animal or plant life, or health, could fall within either federal or
provincial jurisdiction, depending mainly upon whether the measure adopting them could be
classified as in relation to criminal law, and thus within federal jurisdiction, or property and civil
rights, and thus within provincial jurisdiction. The point is that not all of the matters which are
listied as legitimate objectives can be relied upon by governments to justify their measures under the
Agreement.
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objective. It therefore contains an element-the disproportionate
part-which goes beyond what is required to carry out that objective.
How should that element be considered for constitutional purposes?
What then happens if the provinces negotiate a settlement to remedy
this barrier and implement the result of that settlement by legislation?
Is this settlement legislation outside of provincial jurisdiction because it
is in relation to interprovincial trade?
As stated, one type of response to these questions is to ignore
the constitutional issues and advocate an approach to interprovincial
trade barriers which is entirely outside of the Constitution. The problem
with this approach is that litigants may not cooperate. It is not difficult
to envision a scenario where an aggrieved party seeks to challenge a
provincial measure as being both inconsistent with the Agreement and
unconstitutional. The incentive for taking the latter approach is that a
private party may not be satisfied with the remedies available under the
Agreement. Again, it is possible to treat these two types of challenges
as entirely unrelated: impediments to the movement of interprovincial
trade should be treated one way for the purposes of the Agreement and
another way for the purposes of the Constitution. However, such an
approach would lead to a serious misalignment in the institutional
treatment of trade barriers in Canada. Governments could be instructed
to approach trade barriers in different, perhaps contradictory, ways for
constitutional purposes and for the purposes of the Agreement. This
would not be a problem if the existing constitutional approach to
interprovincial trade was superior to the approach adopted in the
Agreement. If this were the case, then the Agreement, which is
subordinate to the Constitution, could be ignored to the extent that it
permitted unconstitutional actions. However, as I have sought to
demonstrate, the existing constitutional trade law jurisprudence is not
superior to the way in which the Agreement identifies trade barriers.
Even if the Agreement did not exist, there are good reasons for
rethinking the doctrine in this area. The Agreement thus provides an
impetus towards this reform.
Finally, it is worth noting in this regard that the European Court
of Justice has interpreted the Treaty of Rome as conferring upon
persons "rights which become part of their legal heritage."129 As a
result, that Court has held that the Treaty can be used to require states
to repeal any legislation inconsistent with those rights. Similarly, in
interpreting the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, the
United States Supreme Court has integrated that provision with the
129 See the discussion supra note 125.
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privileges and immunities clause, the purpose of which, according to the
Court in Toomer,
was to help fuse into one Nation a collection of independent, sovereign States. It was
designed to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges
which the citizens of State B enjoy. For protection of such equality the citizen of State A
was not to be restricted to the uncertain remedies afforded by diplomatic processes and
official retaliation. 13 0
The Agreement on Internal Trade adopts many of the concepts
employed in the above arrangements, but the parties to it are not in a
legal position to provide the type of enforceable right to challenge the
legality of trade barriers as is found in other documents. The result is
that Canadians seeking to challenge these barriers may have to rely upon
the remedies available to their governments under the Agreement. In
the words of the United States Supreme Court, they are left with "the
uncertain remedies afforded by diplomatic processes and official
retaliation." It is my submission that a remedy may also be found in the
Constitution.
130 Supra note 73 at 395.
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